Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today Is there a connection?

The case of Belgium

Muriel Sacco and Marco Martiniello

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The full set of reports for this study is available to download:

- Foundation EVZ www.stiftung-evz.de
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Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
CCIB	Consistoire Central Israelite de Belgique (Central Israelite Consistory of Belgium)
CCOJB	Comité de Coordination des Organisations Juives de Belgique (Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations)
CCLJ	Centre Communautaire Laïc Juif (Secular Jewish Communitarian Centre)
CECLR	Centre pour l'Egalité des Chances et la Lutte contre le racism (Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Campaign against Racism)
CFJ	Conseil des Femmes Juives (Council of Jewish Women)
CGRA	Commissariat Général aux Réfugiés et Apatrides (General Commissioner for Refugees and Stateless Persons)
CIRE	Coordination et Initiatives pour les Réfugiés et les Etrangers (Coordination and Initiatives for Refugees and Foreigners)
EU	European Union
EVZ	Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung and Zukunft (Foundation 'Remembrance, Responsibility and Future')
FJO	Forum der Joodse Organisaties (Forum of Jewish Organizations)
FRA	European Agency for Fundamental Rights
MENA	Middle East and North Africa(n)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NVA	Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliance (New Flemish Alliance; a right-wing populist party)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
VB	Vlaams Belang (Flemish Belonging)

Preface

There is a persistent claim that new migrants to Europe, and specifically migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA migrants), carry antisemitism with them. This assertion is made to different degrees in different countries and can take different forms. Nevertheless, in Europe, the association of rising antisemitism with migrants from the Middle East and North Africa is widespread and needs to be evaluated.

MENA migrants have been symbolically central to the migration debate since 2011. These years have been framed by the Arab spring and its aftermath and by Europe's crisis of refugee protection. This research project has focused specifically on MENA migrants,[1] in response to the intensity of this debate, and in accordance with the brief from Foundation EVZ. The central concern of the research project has been to investigate whether the arrival of MENA migrants since 2011 has had an impact on antisemitic attitudes and behaviour in Western Europe. This report deals with the case of Belgium. The report also considers whether government and civil society agencies have identified a problem of antisemitism among MENA migrants. The findings are based on an extensive survey of existing quantitative and qualitative evidence. Additionally, new qualitative research has been undertaken to investigate the experiences and opinions of a range of actors.

This national report contributes to a larger research project conducted in 2016/2017 across five European countries – Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A final report, *Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe Today: is there a connection? Findings and recommendations from a five-nation study*, draws out common trends, makes comparisons and provides recommendations for civil society organizations and for governments.

1 This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. See under Definitions.

Executive Summary

Context

Belgium is a country of immigration and permanent settlement. Since the middle of the 20th century the proportion of foreigners in Belgian society has steadily increased. The number of migrants per annum doubled between 1994 and 2014. The population includes between 30,000 and 35,000 individuals who declare themselves as Jews.

Findings

MENA migrants

According to official sources the proportion and number of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA migrants) arriving in Belgium each year are declining. Indeed, since 2010 there have been fewer asylum seekers and recognized refugees entering Belgium than there were in the early 2000s.

The interviews for this study reveal that new MENA migrants do not understand why they are identified as a 'second' wave, similar to migrants of Moroccan and Turkish descent who are burdened with a negative image. MENA migrants seek to distinguish themselves from the image of these earlier migrants as they try to prove that they want to integrate into the host society. The interviews also reveal that refugees regard themselves as victims of institutional racism during the asylum procedure.

Antisemitism

An opinion survey conducted in 2017 shows that antisemitic views are still widespread among the Belgian population. The survey highlights a correlation between antisemitic and Islamophobic views.

On average, there are fewer than 100 antisemitic incidents per year in Belgium. The pattern of incidents corresponds to escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict has provoked protests and episodes of violence in Belgium and has led to attacks on many Jewish organizations in the early 2000s, 2009 and 2014. The terrorist attack on the Jewish Museum in 2014, attacks in France in 2015 and the heightened level of security at Jewish buildings have increased the feeling of insecurity throughout Belgium's Jewish community.

Our qualitative research highlights several significant elements:

- It demonstrates the heterogeneity of the Jewish population and communal Jewish organizations
- The definition of antisemitism is subject to multiple interpretations that in turn shape perceptions of the phenomenon
- Some Jewish community representatives are seriously concerned about the presumed antisemitism of new MENA migrants. This concern has been fed by the terror acts that have targeted Jewish organizations and individuals in Belgium and in France

- There is not any significant positive or negative contact between Jewish associations and new migrants
- Three factors are cited to explain the alleged antisemitism of recent MENA migrants: their socialization by antisemitic political regimes; their presumed and consequent hostility to Israel; and their presumed similarity to second or subsequent generations of North African migrants who are perceived to carry antisemitic prejudices.

Conclusions

- Fear of antisemitism, and the feeling that antisemitism is neglected or downplayed politically, provoke prejudice towards new MENA migrants.
- Recent MENA migrants have not been reported as perpetrators of antisemitic acts.
- The data reveals, however, a widespread diffusion among the Belgian population of antisemitic prejudices and views associated with conspiracy theories. Antisemitism is also at work in the Belgian political and media spheres and is expressed in discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- Non-EU migrants, and the second and third generations born in Belgium, face discrimination and disadvantages in schooling, in employment and in the housing market. Muslims feel they are viewed as foreigners in Belgium.
- Prejudice towards the Jewish population occurs in a specific context that is characterized by the persistence of antisemitic views among the Belgian population and unequal integration opportunities for first and subsequent generations of migrants.

This research gives rise to two significant conclusions:

- First, the quantitative data does not confirm a rise in antisemitic incidents, but the fear of antisemitism does exist
- Second, the link between the rise of antisemitism and the arrival of new migrants is not significant.

Recommendations

Policy and practice

- In the Belgian multilevel institutional system, it would be useful to map the existing initiatives aimed at the prevention of racism, antisemitism, discrimination and hate crime at the different governmental levels (federal, regional and communitarian). Given the complexity of Belgian institutional structures, it is necessary to have a clear view of what is currently being done and by whom to combat and prevent racism, discrimination and antisemitism.
- Further training should be provided to raise awareness of the different forms of racism and discrimination, for example by including such training as compulsory elements in education programmes as well as in professional training.

- The teaching of immigration and colonization in Belgian history should be given greater emphasis in educational programmes in order to reduce the feeling of marginalization among immigrants and subsequent generations.
- There should be further training for police officers and administrators responsible for recognizing and registering hate crimes, discrimination and racist complaints to enable them to better carry out these tasks.
- Political representatives and media workers should be trained to recognize the trivialization of racism and antisemitism and the consequences of the absence of public condemnation of appeals to violence and hate.
- Public security measures for Jewish buildings should be financed by the state, to ensure equality of treatment and security rights.
- Contact and empathy produces effective results at the individual level and for this reason contacts between Jewish organizations and new migrants should be enhanced and support given to all initiatives that improve inter-ethnic contact and ethnic mixing.

Research

- The link between antisemitic speech, prejudice against migrants and refugees and the rise of left and right populist movements in Belgium should be systematically investigated.
- The extent to which the internet and primary and secondary socialization are the channels of antisemitic discourses and attitudes should be investigated.
- The profiles of perpetrators of antisemitic incidents and of those holding antisemitic views should also be systematically investigated to improve understanding of the social conditions in which these incidents and views are produced.

Introduction

The immediate context

The Belgian population increased from 10,511,382 in 2006 to 11,267,910 in 2016.[2] Belgium is a country of immigration and permanent settlement. The proportion of persons with foreign backgrounds is growing. The population includes between 30,000 and 35,000 individuals who declare themselves as Jews.

Incidents of antisemitism

On average, there are fewer than 100 antisemitic incidents per year in Belgium. With the exception of the terrorist attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014, most antisemitic actions do not target individuals. The pattern of incidents corresponds to escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict has provoked protests and episodes of violence in Belgium and exposed many Jewish organizations to attacks in the early 2000s, 2009 and 2014.

The increased security risks have been acknowledged by Belgian authorities. From 2000, in the context of protests against Israel's policy in the Palestinian territories, antisemitic threats and incidents have been directed towards buildings hosting Jewish organizations in Brussels and Antwerp. In response, the Belgian police authorities have asked Jewish organizations to introduce additional security measures to monitor and control the buildings' entrances.

The relatively low number of antisemitic incidents should not lead one to think that antisemitic views and representations are rare in Belgium. As a recent opinion survey (Scheuer et al., 2017) shows, antisemitic views are still widespread among the population. The survey highlights a correlation between antisemitic and Islamophobic views.

Perceived insecurity of Jews

The terrorist attack on the Jewish Museum in May 2014, the attacks in France in 2015 and the heightened level of security measures at Jewish buildings have increased the feeling of insecurity throughout Belgium's Jewish community. In the aftermath of the terroristic attacks by Daesh, fear increased because the first targets were Jewish, but the news showed that the security risk concerns the overall population.

Although fear of antisemitism has risen among the Jewish population there is no consensus among Jewish representatives interviewed in the course of this research. The Jewish community organizations do not agree on the causes of antisemitism or on the dangers linked to antisemitism. Some experts and organizations see a rise in antisemitism in Belgium, while other organizations are less preoccupied by the rise of antisemitism than by the rise of terroristic threats in general. In this context, fears of new migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA migrants) and refugees are expressed.

2 See http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/statistiques/chiffres/population/structure/agesexe/popbel/.

Immigration to Belgium since 2000

According to official sources (Myria, 2016; CGRA, 2016), the proportion and the numbers of migrants arriving every year are declining. Indeed, even the number of asylum seekers and recognized refugees arriving in Belgium declined between 2000 and 2010. While the proportion of foreigners in Belgian society has steadily increased since the middle of the 20th century, official statistics show that MENA migrants are not the principal group of migrants or people with foreign background in Belgian society.

Antisemitic incidents and new migrants

The quantitative and qualitative data used in this report does not show a rise in antisemitic incidents linked with new migrants. While the qualitative data points to a growing fear of MENA migrants on the part of some representatives of Jewish associations, few concrete contacts between Jewish organizations and newcomers are reported.

Methodology

For this study, we have used quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data includes official statistics concerning migration to Belgium and official registrations of racist, antisemitic and discriminatory incidents. The qualitative data includes mainly semi-structured interviews with representatives of Jewish and migrant organizations and public authorities.

Quantitative data

Two types of quantitative data are referenced in this research: those on antisemitic incidents and those on migration to Belgium. They are produced by existing monitoring tools. It is important to note that the monitoring reflects a social reaction more than objective registration. The data collected are useful for public policy-making in several government sectors, but there is a gap between the data collection and the objective occurrence of the social phenomena (Vanneste et al., 2017).

In Belgium, much of the quantitative data is produced by the Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Campaign against Racism (CECLR). Created in 1993, this autonomous federal administration is in charge of the registration of facts, incidents and complaints related to racism and respect for fundamental rights. Over time, CECLR broadened its scope with the addition of non-racial criteria for discrimination and the prerogative to file complaints based on the law against Holocaust denial. In 2003, it also gained responsibility for determining the extent of the migrant flux and combating human trafficking.[3] The CECLR registers discriminatory facts and complaints reported by victims. Registered discrimination is categorized according to its nature, target, location and so on. Reported incidents can form the basis of a complaint – and eventually could go to court – if they fit within the legal definitions and are recorded in the incident statistics after being verified. In this framework, the centre also monitors antisemitic incidents. In 2013, as the devolution process deepened across the Belgian state, the CECLR was reformed and has become an interfederal institution. In 2015, the CECLR was divided into two organizations. The first is Unia, an independent public institution that combats discrimination and promotes equal opportunities. Unia is responsible for monitoring discrimination (racist, ethnic, age, sexual orientation, religious orientation, health state, national origin, etc.), for preventing discrimination and for launching legal proceedings in these domains. The second organization, Myria, is a federal institution charged with monitoring migration and migration policies in Belgium. Consequently, recent quantitative data on migration in Belgium come primarily from Myria, in collaboration with academic demographic research centres from both the Flemish and the French-speaking parts of Belgium.

Organizations in the Jewish community also contribute data. Since 2000 the Jewish Central Consistory of Belgium (CCIB) has been monitoring antisemitic

3 http://unia.be/fr/propos-dunia#Histoire.

incidents,[4] and since 2001 the website antisemitisme.be has been logging information about antisemitic events. The data collected by this website comes from several sources: emails, telephone hotlines and information gathered by Unia (formerly CECLR). Several types of antisemitic incident are recorded: attacks, aggression, threats, building and monument damage, and ideological and antisemitic remarks, including those on the internet. 'Aggression' means a violation of individual integrity. 'Threats' can be verbal as well as physical. The 'damage' category includes profanation of Jewish remembrance monuments. 'Ideological' includes verbal, symbolic and written acts.

The two main monitoring organizations, Unia and the CCIB, regularly enter into dialogue and compare their data. Since 2004, CECLR has had a vigilance committee dedicated to combatting antisemitism, a body that includes representatives of Jewish organizations (the Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations [CCOJB]; CCIB; Forum of Jewish Organizations [FJO] and officials of the justice, homeland security and equal opportunities departments. The vigilance committee analyses the evolution of antisemitic incidents. It has three main tasks: to exchange information about antisemitism; to systematically analyse concrete cases; and to raise awareness among institutional and policy actors such as the police and education departments (CECLR, 2014, p. 42).

Finally, this report also uses quantitative data from relevant academic research. Apart from linguistic data defining Belgium's language communities, there are no official statistics on the ethnicity, religion or origin of people in Belgium (De Raedt, 2004). The existing data on ethnicity and religion are estimations based on people's family name and nationality at birth.

Qualitative data

For this research, new empirical data was generated, with 28 semi-structured interviews conducted between September 2016 and April 2017, The interviews focused on representatives of a range of groups: Jewish organizations and experts on antisemitism (11); organizations dealing with new migrants (7) and MENA migrants (3); Muslim organizations and experts on Muslim populations in Belgium (4); and organizations and administrations tackling discrimination, racism and hate crimes (3). Most of the interviews were carried out in Brussels, but we also conducted interviews in Antwerp, Liège, Braine-Le-Comte and Verviers.

To organize the semi-structured interviews, we first sent interviewees (or participants or informants) an email presenting the goals of the research and the questions they would be asked. This step was important in building trust during the semi-structured interviews and explaining the framework within which we sought their collaboration. From there, we compared the range of responses. Some Jewish organizations were very interested in the research topic and in the fact that such research was to be conducted. Others expressed reservations about the research topic as itself suggesting prejudice against new migrants. In contrast, associations supporting new migrants were eager to collaborate because they expected the research results would contradict prejudices about new migrants and validate positive images of them. Some people refused

4 The results of the monitoring of antisemitism by the Belgian Jewish Central Consistory are available online at www.antisemitisme.be.

to participate in the interviews, either claiming insufficient knowledge of the research topic or arguing that bias against new migrants expressed itself in the initial research goals.

The interviews themselves followed the topic guide prepared for the project. Some adaptations were made in order to collect concrete examples of experiences of racism, antisemitism or discrimination and interviewees' own definitions of terms such as antisemitism, discrimination, stigmatization or harassment (see appendix). These interviews were recorded but not transcribed in full because of the short duration of the research contract.

In this research, we draw upon a great deal of quantitative data that helps us to determine the extent of antisemitism and migration in Belgium. While qualitative data is useful in understanding the diverse definitions of antisemitism among Jewish organizations, concrete cases of antisemitism and the consequences of antisemitism among the Jewish population, this data is not sufficient on its own. The qualitative interviews highlight concrete living conditions that new migrants experience in the years following their arrival in Belgium. The demands of their new circumstances and the difficulty of acquiring a stable residence permit allow them few opportunities and little time to focus on other issues in their daily lives.

Definitions

This research project uses the United Nations and World Bank definitions of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) and, in addition, includes Afghanistan, Eritrea and Turkey. These three countries are included because of their profile either in the migration/refugee statistics or in current public debates in some European countries.

We have taken the widest possible definition of MENA migrants in order to avoid missing any causal relationships that could be overlooked using more restrictive delineations. The following countries are all included in this study: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Western Sahara Territory and Yemen.

This research uses existing official categories of migrants because most of the official statistics in Belgium are based upon them. However, there are significant gaps in the data. For example, MENA migrants do not appear in official statistical categories and nomenclature about migration in Belgium. Migrants are categorized according to their status, or by country of origin, by nationality, by type of authorization and so on. An immigrant can ask to stay in Belgium, but the response will depend on the purpose of their journey, the length of their stay, their country of origin and their socio-economic resources.

In Belgium, migrants who have been accepted into the asylum procedure are deemed asylum seekers. Their admissibility must be recognized in order for them to apply for the procedure. The asylum procedure usually has three possible outcomes: recognized refugee status, subsidiary protection or the denial of protection and thus the order to quit the territory. The length of the procedure varies. Throughout the procedure, asylum seekers are under the authority of Fedasil, the Belgian federal agency in charge of asylum seekers, which must provide them with material support for the duration of the process. Between 2003 and 2009, applicants received a limited residence permit and a work permit and therefore had access to the labour market for 12 months. The work permit was renewable and valid for all salaried professions. Since the decree of 22 December 2009, asylum seekers cannot apply for a work permit and work legally. During the procedure, asylum seekers live in a designated reception centre. Since 1995, asylum seekers have not been included in official population statistics.

Those asylum seekers who have received recognized refugee status are deemed refugees. This recognized refugee status gives them access to a large range of rights (access to the labour market, a minimum social income, social housing, training, naturalization, etc.). They are exempt from the need for work permits but their status as refugees gives them a five-year residence permit.

1 Historical Context

Immigration and Antisemitism Pre-2011

1.1 Immigration before 2011

Since the middle of the 20th century, Belgium has been a country of immigration. An increase in labour migration was one of the main goals of immigration policies in the decades following World War II. Accordingly, Belgium concluded bilateral conventions with several Mediterranean countries in order to achieve this policy goal – to provide enough workers for Belgian industry and to maintain demographic levels. But this immigration policy was restricted following the economic crisis of the early 1970s (Martiniello & Rea, 2012).

Figure 1 illustrates the growing proportion of foreigners (stock) in Belgium since the 1960s. This data confirms the assumption that Belgium is an immigration country.

Figure 1: Population with foreign nationality in Belgium, 1890–2010



Source: http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/statistiques/chiffres/population/structure/natact/#.WIXvdlyMGFY

Since the 1970s, the government has ceased to promote labour migration as an official policy. However, the arrival of migrants has not drawn to a halt. Indeed, other avenues of migration to Belgium still exist. Figure 2 shows that, despite several restrictions in migration policies, the annual number of people with foreign nationalities, born outside Belgium and with foreign backgrounds, has grown consistently since the beginning of the 1990s. In 2015, 1,255,270 persons were of foreign nationality and 1,605,776 were immigrants.

Figure 2: The stock of the population with foreign nationality, foreign at birth and the migrant population, 1991–2015



Source: Myria, 2016, p. 57

1.2 Political and policy context

The immigration and integration policy landscape in Belgium is complex. Political devolution has led to communitarian and regional differences. After several decades of active recruitment of migrant workers, or 'guest workers', and the implementation of a zero-immigration doctrine, the Belgian political elites gradually allowed the permanent settlement of a majority of migrant workers and their families. Migrant workers did not return to their home countries, despite rising unemployment in the manufacturing sector, where they were mainly employed, and despite the termination in 1974 of the policy promoting labour migration. The permanent presence of migrant workers was therefore recognized by the Belgian political elites, especially from the 1980s, whereas for many preceding years migrant workers and their families had been expected to leave if their work came to an end.

The course of Belgian history, and in particular tensions between the Flemish and the Francophone parts of the country, have led to the creation of subnational entities (communities and regions) with full legislative and executive powers and also to demands for cultural and political separation. In this way, Belgium became a multinational state (Martiniello, 1999), very different from the model of nationhood defined by R. Brubaker (Adam and Martiniello, 2013). First, in the 1970s, three linguistic communities were created. Their authority was mainly confined to education and culture matters. In the 1980s, three regions were institutionalized (the Walloon and Flemish regions in 1980, the Brussels region in 1989), with authority over economic and labour market policy. Successive state reforms transferred other areas of administration to these subnational entities, giving rise to a complex landscape of immigration and integration policies. Several measures focusing on people with migrant backgrounds have been progressively adopted at the different levels of government, gradually transforming Belgium into a country that is very liberal in terms of immigrant rights.

Nonetheless, several prerogatives remain located at the federal level in spite of devolution. The Aliens Law of 15 December 1980 aimed to reduce immigration

by regulating access to the country, as well as the settlement and removal of foreigners. During the 2000s, minimum income requirements were introduced for migrant students and family reunification (the latter via the law of 8 July 2011), and immigration policy were progressively restricted under pressure from the Flemish centre-right parties, especially the populist right-wing New Flemish Alliance party (NVA).

These policies and issues have become increasingly politicized. Electoral competition must be taken into consideration if we are to understand the restrictive dimensions of immigration and integration policies in Belgium, influenced first by the increase in extreme-right voters and subsequently by the growth of right-wing populist parties (Gsir et al., 2016). In Flanders in the 1990s, the electoral rise of the extreme-right Flemish Belonging party (formerly Vlaams Blok) led to a swing to the political right and put restrictive immigration and integration policies on the political agenda. That shift in the political landscape explains the coexistence of diverse policy orientations, from liberal measures to restrictive tools and visions. Even if the strength of the extreme-right party has declined since the 2000s, the NVA promotes stringent integration and immigration policies and attracts votes from extreme-right and centre-right parties, which pushes other Flemish parties to support similar political issues (Gsir et al., 2016). Meanwhile, left-wing parties remain in the majority in Belgium's francophone subnational entities. In these areas, electoral competition has a similarly direct impact on federal government, with Flemish and francophone parties competing to impose their own and often divergent representations on federal policies (ibid., p. 1655). This is why liberal impulses, such as the belief in immigrants' right to vote, coexist with coercive immigration policies.

The recent reforms of migration policies, which translate EU directives into Belgian law, aim to combat fraud in family reunification cases, prevent forced marriages, reduce the length of the asylum procedure and foster voluntary return (Gsir et al., 2016, p. 1659). At the same time, they also set out to improve controls so as to prevent abuse in the allocation of social benefits.

In recent years, legal and institutional differentiation between EU citizens and third country migrants has been reduced. Transitional measures for EU workers from the new EU member states and from the EU enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013 have been implemented in order to limit such workers' access to the labour market. At the same time, the settlement of high-skilled workers has been facilitated. The coordination of social integration policy and asylum and migration policies has led to major control and regulation of the social benefits provided to newcomers. The coercive approach in migration policies has been extended to EU citizens who are no longer entitled to social benefits if they apply as unemployed. Moreover, non-active working EU citizens were deprived of residence permits because they were claiming social benefits in Belgium, a process in which some EU citizens were expelled (Gsir et al., 2016, p. 1662).

If Belgian migration policies are restrictive, migrant integration policies contain certain innovative dimensions. These contrasting trends in policies towards migrants and second– and third-generation migrants constitute 'the Belgian integration paradox': the coexistence of integration policies and electoral pressures from the extreme right (Adam, 2013). Following the recognition of the permanent settlement of migrant workers, several regulations have

improved the recognition of immigrants in Belgian society, extending their civic rights and their protection. First among these was the law of 31 July 1981, preventing and punishing racism, xenophobia and discrimination. In 1994, the law was extended to the employment sector. Discrimination based on ethnicity, colour, origin, or nationality and preferential treatment in matters of placement, professional training, job offers, recruitment, contracting or layoff are punishable by law. The law of 25 February 2003, revised by the law of 10 May 2007, incorporates EU directives, targeting direct and indirect discrimination not only in employment, but also in labour relationships and welfare services. In the process it defines the criteria according to which a complaint for discrimination can be filed: age, sexual orientation, civil state, wealth, philosophical or religious convictions, political convictions, trade-union affiliation, state of health, disability, physical or genetic characteristics, social origin, birth, nationality, race, skin colour, ethnic or national ancestry, language or gender.

Moreover, from the mid-1980s the conditions for obtaining Belgian nationality were progressively relaxed by the introduction of the *jus solis* and the removal of the requirement for a police inquiry into an applicant's language skills. But the law of 4 December 2012 stipulated that in order to apply for Belgian nationality candidates had to provide proof of five years of residence in the country and knowledge of one of the three national languages, along with evidence of economic integration (i.e. employment). More recently, the European directive on the 'passive and active electoral rights' of 'EU nationals residing in member states other than their own' (Lafleur, 2011, p. 493) gave European citizens the right to vote and to be elected in local and European elections. In 2004, the right to vote in local elections was extended to foreigners of non-EU member states who had been living in Belgium for at least five years.

There are major differences between the integration policies created by the various subnational entities. At the subnational level, the different electoral configurations in the Flanders, Brussels and Walloon regions are not the only factors behind the different policy orientations between the regions and the French-speaking community (Adam and Martiniello, 2013). After a short period of convergence, the immigrant integration policies of French-speaking and Flemish areas began to follow divergent paths. From 1974 to 1980, the Flemish and Walloon communities received jurisdiction over immigrant integration policy. In both entities, immigrant integration policy, labelled 'reception policy of migrant workers', focused on financing 'social non-profit organizations linked with the Socialist and the Catholic pillars' for social and socio-judicial guidance, language courses and activities promoting immigrant cultures (Adam, 2013, p. 553). Similar policies were followed by both entities, which gradually moved toward promoting the equal participation of permanent residents. Adam (2013) argues that these integration policies constituted a form of interventionist multiculturalism, differing mainly in the fact that the Flemish community established the Vlaams Overleg Comite Opbouwerk migratie as a device to coordinate migrant activities with those of regional integration centres.

At the end of the 1980s, the linguistic communities began to frame immigrant integration policies very differently. The French-speaking entities took an assimilationist turn, whereas the Flemish government increasingly mixed multiculturalist and assimilationist measures. Since the 1990s, immigrant integration has become a political issue in both communities with the growth of extreme-right

parties and the outbreak of youth riots in Brussels. The French-speaking political elites opted for more assimilationist policies until 2009. The aim of targeting the deprived population, and not only people of foreign origin, derived from their wish to avoid 'origin' differentiation and competition among people living in the same place and under similar conditions (Rea, 2006). The difficulty in categorizing second-generation migrants as foreigners when they were born in Belgium and have Belgian nationality, and the racist views found among the mainstream political elites, together explain the avoidance of specific policies for people with migrant origins (Rea, 2006). The integration policies targeted poor neighbourhoods by financing extra-curricular educational activities for children and youngsters, including French and literacy courses, sociocultural activities and social assistance. But the organizations providing these activities were mostly linked to Catholic and socialist institutions and targeted a non-mono-ethnic and diversified public. Ethnic or migrant organizations did not receive financial resources from these integration policies because of suspicion of ethnic segregation and the reification of differences that they could produce. In the Walloon region, several regional centres of integration have been created, which in theory are free to follow their own policies but which have few resources. Regional differences in integration policies meant that those adopted in Brussels more assimilationist than those in the Walloon region. In 2014, the Walloon government adopted a more interventionist, but still assimilationist, integration policy by creating a compulsory integration path for new migrants, including civic integration courses on rules, values and institutions, linguistic courses and professional training, along with sanctions for those newcomers refusing to follow the initial steps of the path (Gsir et al., 2016, p. 1661).

In Flanders, despite the strong presence of an extreme-right party in the political sphere, integration policies were characterized by an interventionist multicultural approach. Indeed, ethnic organizations were financed to encourage their emancipatory role and their valorization of the culture of origin (Adam, 2013). Moreover, a forum for ethnic minorities has been created (Adam, 2013). In 2003, a compulsory integration path, called Inburgering, was introduced by the Liberal party (VLD), which had recently entered the Flemish regional and community government. These new integration policy tools were heralded politically as a sign that the government had drawn lessons from prior failures of integration (Adam and Martiniello, 2013). They gave an assimilationist dimension to the Flemish integration policies and involved the use of conditionality and sanctions for newcomers who did not comply with the expected requirements.

In all the subnational entities, the higher standards expected of new migrants have been institutionalized and linked to coercive measures in cases of non-compliance. These policy orientations highlight fears of welfare and hospitality abuses and the growing request for cultural conformity in line with the assimilationist and coercive turn in integration and migration policies.

1.3 Immigration from MENA to Belgium

Belgium has become a country of settlement for migrants in the aftermath of the two world wars. In addition to bilateral agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal to respond to the needs of the Belgian industrial labour market and coal production, immigration from MENA countries began decades ago with the bilateral labour migration agreements signed by Belgium with Morocco and Turkey (1964), Tunisia (1967) and Algeria (1970) (Martiniello and Rea, 2012). During the 1960s these labour migration agreements were extended to workers' families in order to mitigate Belgian demographic decline, but they came to an end with the economic crisis of the 1970s, when many migrant workers settled in Belgium indefinitely. In this section, we focus on Moroccan and Turkish migrants and subsequent migration to give an overview of immigration to Belgium.

Moroccans constitute one of the largest foreigner groups in Belgium. In 2004, there were estimated to be 140,303 Moroccans in Belgium (Loriaux, 2005, p. 1), but this number does not include Moroccans who acquired Belgian nationality. Between 1985 and 1992, a total of 90,642 Moroccans became Belgian citizens. In 2012, the number of people of Moroccan origin was estimated to be around 429,580 (Schoonvaere, 2014, p. 7). Between 1991 and 2012, the numbers rose from 1.6% to 3.9% of the total population, with Brussels rapidly becoming the area of residence for 45% of Belgium's Moroccan population. The growth of the Moroccan population is linked to the persistence of migration flows.

Table 1: Moroccans in Belgium, 1961–1996

Years	Number of Moroccans in Belgium
1961	461
1970	39,294
1981	105,133
1991	142,098
1996	104,303

Source: Loriaux, 2005, p. 1

Between 1956 and 1977, Moroccan immigrants were statistically included in figures for African immigration to Belgium. Figure 3 shows that Moroccan immigration declined after a peak in 1963 of 14,000 arrivals and has consistently increased since 1985. In the 2000s, the average number of arrivals annually is comparable with the 1960s. Today, more than 8,000 Moroccan migrants arrive in Belgium each year.

Figure 3: African and Moroccan nationals in Belgium, 1956–2012



Source: Schoonvaere, 2014, p. 42

Immigration from Turkey is also significant. As Figure 4 shows, there is a growing group of people of Turkish nationality living in Belgium: from 320 in 1961, the number has risen to 152,000 in 2010. The numbers increased particularly since 1990 when conditions relaxed for the acquisition of Belgian nationality. Since 2000, more than half of Turkish nationals living in Belgium have become Belgian citizens.

Figure 4: Persons born with Turkish nationality, 1961–2010



Source: Schoonvaere, 2013, p. 6.

Figure 5 shows that Turkish migration to Belgium has been continuous since the 1960s, though the annual number of Turkish migrants varies. When the policy to encourage labour migration came to an end, at least 2,000 Turkish migrants were arriving in Belgium each year. In the two last decades, a steady number of Turkish migrants have applied for asylum in Belgium.

Figure 5: Turkish immigration to Belgium, 1963–2009



Source: Schoonvaere, 2013, p. 31

Figure 6 shows that males predominated in Turkish migration to Belgium during the period when labour migration was encouraged. After this initial period, the percentage of men remained constant, although total numbers steadily decreased.

Figure 6: The percentage of men among Turkish immigrants in Belgium, 1963–2009



Source: Schoonvaere, 2013, p. 32

As labour migration ceased to be encouraged, three major factors affected the routes through which migrants could reach Belgium. First, immigration to Belgium continued through other migration policy channels, such as family reunification, educational visas, humanitarian pathways and work permits. A second factor might be termed the individualization of the migrant path. In a more restrictive immigration policy context, migration to Belgium increasingly resulted from individual or group strategies rather than official government programs. A third factor was the growing diversity in the countries from which migrants originated. At the end of the 1980s, migrants arrived in Belgium from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe due to the war in former Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, the number of asylum seekers increased rapidly due to the destabilization

of the Great Lake in Africa and the Rwandan genocide. In the 2000s, this diversification in migrant home countries continued. Indian workers, Chinese students, asylum seekers from sub-Saharan countries (Cameroon, Ghana and Guinea) and Asian countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan) immigrated to Belgium. The enlargement of the EU also brought an increase in migrants from Eastern European countries.

1.4 Antisemitism before 2011

The Jewish population in Belgium is relatively small. There are no official sources that measure the size of the Jewish population because, as we have seen, ethnic statistics do not exist in Belgium (De Raedt, 2004). But, according to some estimates drawn from a survey based on self-declaration of Jewishness, there are approximately 30,000 Jews living in Belgium (Longman, 2008; Ben-Rafael, 2014). The majority of Belgian Jews are Ashkenazi. They live mainly in Antwerp and Brussels. Jews in Brussels tend to be more liberal or secular, while in Antwerp there is a predominance of Orthodox religious Jews. There are approximately 20,000 Jews in Antwerp.

As mentioned in the section on Methodology, since 2000 antisemitic incidents in Belgium have been recorded through two channels. On the institutional and public side, antisemitic incidents are officially recorded by Unia (ex-CECLR). On the Jewish community side, the Jewish Central Consistory of Belgium monitors incidents of antisemitism through the website antisemitisme.be. It is important to remember that there is a difference between antisemitic incidents and the record of antisemitic incidents or complaints (Vanneste et al., 2017). Not all complaints are considered valid. Not everyone decides to report incidents, especially when they involve insults, harassment or graffiti. The interviews with representatives of Jewish organizations confirm that the decision to report is closely related to an individual's conception of antisemitism. The website antisemitism.be confirms that some people decide not to press charges because of past police refusals to record aggressive incidents as antisemitic. Therefore, not all incidents are reported. Like other hate crime statistics, those on antisemitic incidents provide a register of institutional record-keeping rather than of people's actual experience of aggression.

Figure 7: Antisemitic incidents recorded per year, 2000–2017



Source: Antisemitisme.be, 2016, Rapport 2015, p. 15

Figure 7 shows the variation in the number of antisemitic incidents reported and that number's increase since 2000. After 2003, the number of antisemitic incidents registered annually has never gone below 40. The figures are difficult to interpret: a rise can be followed by a marked decline and may be linked with the massive diffusion of the internet and the daily opportunity to express antisemitic views that it provides. In addition, Figure 7 shows that there have been two recent spikes of antisemitic incidents. During 2009, 109 antisemitic incidents were registered in Belgium. This constituted a considerable increase in comparison with previous years. After this peak, numbers returned to earlier, lower levels. In 2014 there was a further significant rise (discussed in more detail below).

Figure 8 shows that between 2004 and 2010 antisemitic incidents on the internet steadily increased, especially from 2006.

Figure 8: Reports of antisemitic incidents, 2004–2010



Sources: CECLR, 2011; Rapport Discrimination 2010, 2011, pp. 68–69

Not all the incidents reported and recorded are punishable by current laws. For instance, in 2010 57 antisemitic incidents were reported to the CECLR. Some 51% of the antisemitic complaints were punishable by laws against antisemitism, 42% were not cases sanctioned by antidiscrimination law while 7% were not considered by CECLR as instances of antisemitism at all (CECLR, 2011, pp. 68–69).

1.5 Summary

- Belgium became an immigration country during the 20th century.
- Immigration from MENA countries began decades ago with bilateral agreements on labour migration signed by between Belgium and Morocco and Turkey in 1964, Tunisia in 1967 and Algeria in 1970 (Martiniello and Rea, 2012).
- The MENA migrants were mainly men in the first period of immigration to Belgium and were in Belgium to work in specific sectors of the labour market, namely the metallurgic industries and coal mining.
- The migration policy framework was radically revised in 1973 following the end of the positive labour migration policy. Despite new restrictions on immigration, migrants from MENA countries continued to arrive in Belgium.
- There is continuing diversification in migrants' origins and their routes of entry into the country.
- Once legally accepted in Belgium, most new MENA migrants are confronted with discriminatory processes in the labour market.
- While integration policies were initially driven by different policy paradigms, they are progressively converging.
- In Belgium, the monitoring of antisemitic incidents began in 2000. There was a marked rise in antisemitic incidents in 2009 compared with previous years.
- The rise in antisemitism has been most marked on the internet. Since 2006 this platform has accounted for the greatest number of recorded incidents.

2 Current Demographics

2.1 Immigrants and native born

In 2015, the Belgian population totalled 11,209,028, not including undocumented people or asylum seekers (people requesting refugee status or those who are stateless). The Belgian population is mainly composed of people of Belgian birth. Some 9% of the population (959,989) had another nationality before accepting Belgian nationality, while 11% (1,255,270) of the population in Belgium is of foreign nationality. In 2015, 2,206,259 persons, or 20% of the population, did not have Belgian nationality at birth. This figure does not include second– and third-generation Belgian-born migrants who have only one parent with a foreign nationality and who could therefore claim foreign origin or identity.

2.2 Country of origin of foreigners living in Belgium

In 2015, 11% of the Belgian population were of foreign nationality, in other words a total of 1,255,270 people. As Table 2 shows, a high proportion of the foreigners in Belgium come from EU countries. The non-EU foreigners come primarily from Morocco, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Congo and Russia. This table highlights the low proportion of MENA migrants, who represent only 12% of the foreigners living in Belgium.

Table 2: Nationalities of foreigners living in Belgium, 1 January 2015

Country	Number	Percentage
France	159,352	13%
Italy	156,977	13%
Netherlands	149,199	12%
Morocco	82,009	7%
Poland	68,403	5%
Romania	65,768	5%
Spain	60,386	5%
Portugal	42,793	3%
German	39,294	3%
Turkey	36,747	3%
Bulgaria	28,721	2%
United Kingdom	23,974	2%
Democratic Republic of Congo	20,625	2%
Greece	16,275	2%
Russia	12,434	1%
Others (origins with fewer than 1,000 people per nationality)	293,313	23%
Total	1,255,270	100%

Source: Myria, 2016, p. 60 (from Statistics Belgium Demo UCL)

Note: Foreigners living in Belgium could be immigrants (born in another country with the nationality of their country of birth) or people born in Belgium but not holding Belgian nationality because neither of their parents is Belgian or is born in Belgium. See the paragraph above the table 'Immigrants and native born'.

As Table 3 shows, among those who had obtained Belgian nationality by 1 January 2015, people of Moroccan and Turkish origins are ranked in the first two places and represent 40% of this statistical category. It is interesting to note that they ask for Belgian nationality more frequently than do migrants of other nations. Persons with Middle Eastern nationalities generally do not apply for Belgian nationality.

Table 3: National origin of people who had obtained Belgian nationality, 1 January 2015

Countries of origin	Number	Percentage
Morocco	224,108	24%
Turkey	119,011	13%
Italy	116,206	12%
France	50,042	5%
DR of Congo	37,381	4%
Netherlands	31,138	3%
Poland	23,020	2%
Ex-Yugoslavia	21,998	2%
Algeria	17,596	2%
Germany	16,325	2%
Spain	13,609	1%
Russia	13,417	1%
Tunisia	10,932	1%
Romania	9,586	1%
Rwanda	9,541	1%
Others	237,079	25%
Total	950,989	100%

Source: Myria, 2016, p. 74

Unfortunately, the available data does not systematically include gender and age differences for each national category. Figure 9, covering the period 2001 to 2010, shows the gender and age distribution of asylum seekers, recognized refugees and people who have received subsidiary protection. Men are more numerous than women in this segment of migrants, comprising 57% of the group. Some 108,856 individuals appear in the database between 2001 and 2010 (Rea and Wets, 2014, p. 58).

Figure 9: Distribution of asylum seekers, recognized refugees and subsidiary protection by age, sex and gender, 2010



Source: Rea and Wets, 2014, p. 58

Figure 10 shows the 2009 family status of migrants reaching Belgium between 2002 and 2009 from the sample used by Rea and Wets (2014). Single arrivals predominate, followed by children of married parents and married couples with children.

Figure 10: Family status in 2009 of migrants reaching Belgium, 2002–2009



Source: Rea and Wets, 2014, p. 59

Figure 11 shows that 20% of the population studied (migrants entering Belgium between 2002 and 2010) came from a MENA country. The majority of asylum seekers came from Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Approximatively 20% of migrants from Middle East and North African countries (20,000) were minors, but the data does not say whether these children arrived alone or with at least one adult relative.

Figure 11: Country of birth of asylum seekers, refugees and people under subsidiary protection entering Belgium, 2002–2010



Source: Rea and Wets, 2014, p. 60

As Figure 12 shows, the number of foreigners gaining Belgian nationality has decreased considerably over the years. The number dropped from 61,980 in 2000 to 26,238 in 2015. That figure confirms that access to Belgian nationality has been steadily restricted. As we explained above (Gsir et al., 2016), this decline reflects the coercive policy orientation change in this domain.

Figure 12: Numbers of foreigners becoming Belgians, 2000–2015



Source: Myria, 2015, p. 64

2.3 Summary of findings

- People with foreign nationalities and backgrounds represent a growing part of the Belgian population.
- Migrants from former Belgian colonies are not the largest group. Many foreigners living in Belgium come from European countries.
- Migrants from the countries with which Belgian signed labour immigration conventions continue to enter Belgium. The end of labour immigration did not mean the end of migration from these countries. Migrants from these countries constitute a large proportion of migrants from MENA countries.
- Many individuals with migrant backgrounds have asked for Belgian nationality, which means that many such people consider their stay in Belgium to be permanent.
- Moroccan and Turkish migrants are the two largest groups of foreigners to ask for and obtain Belgian nationality.
- Access to Belgian nationality was facilitated in the 1990s and became more limited in the years after 2000.

3 Immigration Since 2011

3.1 Stocks

In this period, Moroccan and Turkish nationals were the largest groups of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East countries.

Table 4 presents Statbel (the Belgian statistical office) data on the stock of foreigners in Belgium from MENA countries in 2009 and 2016. This statistical source indicates that in 2009 there were approximately 147,469 MENA migrants living in Belgium compared with some 162,569 in 2016, which represents 12.5% of the population with a foreign nationality. As mentioned before, data on Moroccan and Turkish nationals does not reflect the overall population with Moroccan or Turkish backgrounds because it does not include those who had already obtained Belgian nationality.

Table 4: Foreigners from MENA countries, 2009 and 2016

Nationality in the population of Belgium (stock)	2009	2016
Total population in Belgium	10,753,080	11,267,919
Total of foreign nationality	1,013,260	1,295,660
Afghanistan	1,897	9,623
Algeria	8,431	10,083
Bahrain	3	Not mentioned
Djibouti	365	Not mentioned
Egypt	1,097	1,720
Eritrea	Not mentioned	Not mentioned
Iraq	2,539	7,451
Iran	3,944	4,349
Israel	1,464	1,148
Jordan	299	Not mentioned
Kuwait	10	Not mentioned
Lebanon	1,700	1,936
Libya	170	Not mentioned
Mauritania	736	936
Morocco	79,426	82,817
Oman	10	Not mentioned
Qatar	1	Not mentioned
Saudi Arabia	41	Not mentioned
State of Palestine/West Bank & Gaza	285	Not mentioned
Syrian Arab Republic/Syria	1,633	Not mentioned
Tunisia	3,802	5,856
Turkey	39,565	36,650
United Arab Emirates	2	Not mentioned
Western Sahara Territory	Not mentioned	Not mentioned
Yemen	43	Not mentioned

Source: Statbel (2009) and Statbel (2016)

Flows

The number of migrants per annum doubled between 1994 and 2014 (see Figure 13). In 1994, more than 50% (n: 60,751) of foreigners in Belgium came from EU countries. Unsurprisingly, this proportion has grown with the entrance of new member states into the EU. The proportion of European migrants grew from 52% (n: 77,897) of the total immigrants to Belgium in 2004 to 64% (n: 128,465) in 2014. The proportion of migrants from MENA countries rose from 1994 to 2004 but declined thereafter.

Figure 13: Areas of origin of foreigners entering Belgium, 1994, 2004 and 2014



Source: Myria; 2016, p. 74

Table 5 gives more details about the country of origin of immigrants who arrived in Belgium in 2015. Obviously, migrants from MENA countries are not the largest group of migrants to have arrived in Belgium in 2015. Most MENA migrants who arrived in 2015 came from Morocco, but Morocco is only seventh in terms of numbers after migrants from EU countries. It is important to note that the undocumented persons who represent a major component of the Belgian informal labour market are not included in the data. Some authors estimate that between 50,000 and 100,000 undocumented people currently live in Brussels.

Table 5: Country of origin of migrants entering Belgium in 2015 (above 1,000)

Country of origin	Number in 2015
Romania	15,002
France	14,556
Netherlands	9,886
Poland	7,393
Italy	6,907
Spain	6,440
Bulgaria	5,723
Morocco	5,291
Portugal	3,954

Country of origin	Number in 2015
Germany	2,951
India	2,692
United States of America	2,478
Turkey	2,052
United Kingdom	2,052
Syria	1,726
China	1,662
Afghanistan	1,654
Greece	1,459
Cameroon	1,457
Russia	1,329
Guinea	1,211
Hungary	1,144
Brazil	1,128

Source: Myria, 2016, p. 73

As Table 6 shows, the immigration administration confers a variety of titles on non-EU migrants applying to stay in Belgium, which together illustrate the range of immigration channels available and the percentage of migrants applying for each. Family reunification, educational migration and asylum seekers receive a lot of attention by Belgian media and politicians, but there are also work-related and humanitarian motives for immigrating to Belgium. Between 2010 and 2014, the numbers of humanitarian and family migrants have declined, while the professional and student migrants are stable and the number of refugees has doubled. The decline in the number of humanitarian visas coincides with the deepening of domestic war in Middle Eastern countries. It clearly demonstrates a restrictive turn in the delivering of humanitarian visas, but not in the number of migrants, as Figure 11 shows. Moreover, Table 6 indicates a steady rise in the number of refugees since 2010. Beyond differences between categories, Table 6 shows a diminution in the granting of first residence permits between 2010 and 2014. Asylum seekers are not included in this table.

Table 6: Annual distribution of first residence permits in Belgium between 2010 and 2014, according to title of permit

	Family	Education	Paid activities	Refugees and subsidiary protection	Humanitarian	Other reasons	First title
2010	30,546	5,899	4,347	2,059	10,944	4,010	57,855
2011	30,438	5,834	4,705	2,984	6,989	4,619	55,449
2012	25,060	5,813	4,647	3,737	3,813	4,208	47,278
2013	22,266	5,902	4,347	3,918	1,601	4,429	42,462
2014	23,114	6,286	4,768	4,306	800	4,549	43,823

Source, Myria, 2016, p. 84

Table 7: Leave to remain for non-EU migrants, by nationality and motive, 2014

Arrival reason	Number	Family	Paid activities	Humanitarian	Education	Refugee status and subsidiary protection	Other reason
Morocco	5,565	74%					17%
India	2,568	44%	47%		10%		
United States	2,374	41%	35%		14%		10%
Turkey	1,953	61%	10%		15%		11%
China	1,671	32%	17%		41%		7%
Syria	1,611	29%	1%		+/– 2%	63%	6%
Cameroon	1,423	44%			43%		6%
DR Congo	1,416	67%			13%	7%	10%
Afghanistan	1,263	40%				54%	
Russia	1,148	48%	14%		13%		8%
Brazil	1,107	45%	9%		24%		16%
Guinea	1,062	68%				22%	6%

Source: Foreigners Office and Eurostat quoted by Myria, 2016, p. 85

Table 7 shows that arrival motives differ according to nationality. Among MENA countries, the old countries of immigration to Belgium send migrants for family reasons, while migrants from other MENA countries, such as Syria and Afghanistan, primarily ask for refugee status.

Table 8: Distribution of Visa C and D by nationality, 2015

	Visa C (less than 90 days)	Visa D (more than 90 days)
South Africa	4,627 (2%)	
Thailand	5,734 (3%)	
Morocco	6,457 (3%)	2,189 (8%)
Ukraine	6,459 (3%)	
Philippines	7,184 (4%)	
Turkey	11,027 (4%)	1,092 (4%)
DR Congo	13,878 (6%)	
Russia	14,366 (7%)	
India	27,861 (14%)	3,260 (12%)
China	42,380 (22%)	1,469 (6%)
Syria		1,224 (5%)
United States		1,358 (5%)
Japan		940 (4%)
Cameroon		938 (4%)
Canada		614 (2%)

	Visa C (less than 90 days)	Visa D (more than 90 days)
Afghanistan		818 (3%)
Other Countries	55,466 (29%)	12,186 (47%)
TOTAL	195,429	26,088

Source: Myria, 2016, p. 81

New migrants can also enter Belgium with a visa for a short stay (Visa C) or a long stay (Visa D). In 2015 some 14% of Visa C requests were refused, along with 20% of those for Visa D (Myria, 2016, p. 80). Table 8 presents the proportion by nationality of Visas C and D granted in 2015. The number of limited and short stays allowed is eight times higher than long stay. People who received Visa D are regarded as migrants, while those who obtain a Visa C for a short stay are classed as visitors or tourists. The data in Table 7 indicates that MENA migrants represent only a small proportion of the visas granted. For Visa D, MENA migrants account for fewer than 20% of the visas granted. Among those who obtain a Visa D for a long stay, many ask to renew their residence and work permits every year and thus justify their continued presence in Belgium. Table 8 reveals the striking differences in country of origin between those admitted for short and long stays. Among MENA migrants, people from traditional immigration countries such as Turkey and Morocco in Belgium generally ask for short-stay permits, while migrants from Syria and Afghanistan ask only for long-stay permits.

Figure 14: Distribution of negative and positive decisions for long-stay permits (Visa D) in 2015



Source: Myria, 2016, p. 83

Figure 14 shows that in 2015 the rate of refusal for a long-stay permit (Visa D) was low, at around 20%. Requests for Visa D for purposes of family reunification were the most likely to meet refusal, while requests made for professional reasons had the best chance of success, being accepted in 99% of cases.

3.2 Asylum seekers

While media scrutiny and receipt of public assistance may make asylum seekers the most visible migrant group, they are not the largest group of migrants arriving in Belgium every year. As previously mentioned, asylum seekers do not figure in the annual reckoning of new migrants arriving in Belgium. As Figure 15 shows, the number of asylum seekers has steadily increased in EU countries since 2008, rising from 152,890 in 2008 to 1,255,640 in 2015. A comparison between Figure 15 and Table 9 shows that Belgium receives only a portion of these. In 2010, more than 26,000 migrants applied for refugee status in Belgium, representing 12.5% of the requests registered in EU countries. In 2015, there were 39,000 persons applying for refugee status or subsidiary protection, fewer than 4% of the number of such requests in the EU as a whole. The comparison with the EU scale shows that Belgium is less attractive for migrants today than in 2015. This declining attractiveness almost certainly owes to the implementation of legal and administrative constraints and by the geographical location of Belgium, which is far from EU's Mediterranean border.

Figure 15: Number of first asylum seekers in the EU, 2008–2015



Source: Myria, 2016, p. 95

The increase in the number of asylum seekers at EU level since the beginning of the 2000s is clear. The following figures show the proportion of asylum seekers that have applied to Belgium. Table 9 shows that Belgium has welcomed a decreasing proportion of asylum seekers arriving in the EU territory between 2010 and 2015. It is important to note that the asylum seekers in Belgium are no longer included in the general population statistics.

Table 9: Comparison of the number of asylum seekers in Belgium and the EU, 2010–2016

Year	Number of asylum seekers in Belgium (Source: CGRA)	Number of asylum seekers in the EU
2010	26,559	206,880
2011	32,271	263,160
2012	28,351	278,280
2013	21,222	372,855
2014	22,848	562,680
2015	44,760	1,255,640
2016	18,710	

Source: Myria, 2016, p. 95

Figure 16 highlights the number of asylum seekers per year between 2009 and 2016. It shows a rise between 2009 and 2011 and a decline of requests between 2011 (32,271) and 2014 (22,848). 2015 constitutes a spike in the number of asylum requests, with more than 45,000 filed applications.

Figure 16: Number of asylum seekers per year, 2009–2016

Source: www.cgra.be/sites/default/files/statistiques_dasile_2016_fr_0.pdf (p. 8)

Comparing the arrival of asylum seekers in 2000 and 2015 shows that the number of MENA migrants applying for asylum has risen considerably. The countries of origin of asylum seekers have shifted somewhat during this period, with growing numbers of migrants from China, Syria, Somalia and Eritrea.

Table 10: Countries of origin of asylum seekers entering Belgium in 2000 and 2015

Nationalities	Numbers of asylum seekers in 2000	Numbers of asylum seekers in 2015
India	434	
Azerbaijan	436	
Czech Republic	481	
Guinea	484	
Serbia	510	
Iraq	554	7,772
Kyrgyzstan	574	
Mongolia	589	
Moldavia	622	
Pakistan	643	487
Belorussia	681	
Bosnia	755	
Algeria	800	
Turkey	834	
Afghanistan	850	7,099
Rwanda	887	
Uzbekistan	1,932	
Romania	931	
Georgia	1,212	
Slovakia	1,374	
DR Congo	1,396	538
Ukraine	1,516	316
Bulgaria	1,652	
Kazakhstan	1,903	
Kosovo	1,939	495
Former Yugoslav states	2,220	
Albania	2,573	538
Iran	3,182	537
Russia	3,462	777
Eritrea		327
China		408
Syria		7,554
Somalia		1,932
Undetermined		846
Other countries	6,238	5,035

Source: Myria, 2016, p. 128

In 2016, Afghans represented the largest single national group to ask for asylum in Belgium. People from the Middle East and Africa formed the largest regional groups among asylum seekers.

Table 11: National origin of asylum seekers who applied for refugee status in 2016 in Belgium

Countries of origin	Total number of asylum seekers	First application of asylum seeking	Multiple applications of asylum seeking
Afghanistan	2,767	2,227	540
Syria	2,766	2,612	154
Iraq	1,179	759	420
Guinea	924	721	203
Somalia	847	727	120
Albania	817	649	168
Turkey	736	652	84
Russia	724	409	315
Undetermined	682	624	58
Congo	601	503	98
Other countries	6,667	4,787	1,880
Total in 2016	18,710	14,670	4,040

Source: CGRA, 2016

Figure 17 shows that the number of asylum seekers from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria has grown considerably since 2013, suggesting that the instability and insecurity of these regions has been recognized to some extent by Belgian immigration policy. The figures also show that 2015 was an exceptional year in terms of the number of asylum seekers arriving in Belgium. However, the 2015 trend has not continued. During 2016, 18,710 asylum seekers were recorded, fewer than half the number in 2015 (44,760). There were 14,670 first-time asylum seekers, 4,040 of whom had made multiple requests, which means that one or more requests had been introduced in other countries.[5] In December 2016, there were 1,579 new asylum seekers in Belgium, 25% of them having sought asylum in two or more countries. 16.5% came from Syria, 9.2% from Afghanistan, 6.7% from Turkey and 6.6% from Syria.[6]

5 www.cgra.be/sites/default/files/statistiques_dasile_2016_fr_0.pdf.

6 www.cgra.be/fr/chiffres.

Figure 17: The number of first-time asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Balkans, 2014–2016



Source: Myria, 2016, p. 100

Table 12 shows that there are slight differences in the decisions taken by the Office of the Commissioner General in granting requests for refugee status and subsidiary protection status. These decisions vary depending on the applicants' nationality of origin. Syrian asylum seekers obtain positive results significantly more often than other asylum seekers, such as those from Iraq or Afghanistan.

Table 12: CGRA decisions in 2015 regarding requests for refugee status and subsidiary protection, by nationality

	Refugee status granted	Subsidiary protection granted	Request denied	Cases decided by the CGRA
Syria	3,443	430	81	3,959
Iraq	627	336	435	1,398
Afghanistan	583	407	488	1,478
Other countries	4,497	475	9,236	13,008
Total	9,147	1,648	10,240	19,963

Source: Myria, 2016, p. 103.

Figure 18 also confirms that Syrian migrants continued to be prioritized in the granting of refugee status.

Figure 18: Top ten nationalities and number of individuals who received a decision regarding their application for refugee status



Source: CGRA, p. 6

Since the end of 2000 MENA migrants have comprised the largest group of asylum seekers in Belgium because of the instability in these regions. However, they do not constitute the largest groups of migrants and foreigners living in Belgium. Asylum seeking is not the only migration channel and migrants arrive in Belgium with other administrative statuses. For example, MENA migrants arrive through different channels which depend on the country of provenance. Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans obtain refugee status, while Moroccans and Turks enter Belgium through appeals for family reunification or professional status. Unfortunately, the available data does not mention the age and the gender of the new migrants who have recently arrived in Belgium.

3.3 Summary

- The number of migrants per annum from inside and outside Europe doubled between 1994 and 2014, and the number of asylum seekers doubled between 2014 and 2015.
- The majority of migrants come from EU countries; MENA migrants represent only a small group of recent migrants (12.5% in 2016).
- Moroccans represented the largest group of MENA migrants in 2014 and 2015.
- The heterogeneity of MENA migrants is reflected in the different kinds of Visa D they obtained. While Moroccan and Turkish migrants access the country mainly through appeals for family reunification, Afghani and Syrian migrants are generally accepted as refugees. Not many MENA migrants ask for long-term visas in Belgium for professional or work reasons.
- MENA migrants form the largest group of asylum seekers in Belgium, but not the largest group of foreigners and migrants arriving in Belgium.
- The number of asylum seekers considerably increased in 2015, but this rise was not confirmed in 2016.
- Since 2010, the flow of asylum seekers from Iraq and Afghanistan has significantly increased, while migrants from Eritrea, Somalia and Syria are seeking asylum as well. Syrians and Iraqis are the largest groups of asylum seekers, with Syrian applications more often successful than others.

4 Antisemitism Since 2011

From 2011 to 2103 there were between 64 and 80 recorded antisemitic incidents in Belgium per annum. A significant peak occurred in 2014 (of the same magnitude of 2009) with 109 recorded antisemitic incidents. In 2015, the number of recorded incidents decreased to 70 (see Table 12). According to the website antisemitisme.be, several events in 2014 were contributory factors: the controversy involving the French humourist Dieudonné and the French public figure Alain Soral (the so-called 'Soral-Dieudonné' phenomenon), culminating in judicial proceedings against Dieudonné in Belgium; the attack on the Jewish museum; and the incidents in Belgium related to the escalation of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the summer of 2014 (Antisemitisme.be, 2015). This last factor illustrates the phenomenon of the transnational transfer exportation of the Middle East conflict to Europe (Perrin and Martiniello, 2014).

As Table 13 shows, incidents described as terrorism are rare. The attack on the Jewish Museum in May 2014 was the fifth attack targeting Jews in Belgium since World War II.[7]

Table 13: Number of antisemitic incidents recorded by antisemitisme, 2011–2015

Types of incident	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Attack	0	0	0	1	0
Aggression	7	5	6	6	3
Threats	5	6	4	11	11
Damage to buildings	3	13	5	11	3
Antisemitism broadcast in print and other media (except the internet)	23	26	28	33	24
Antisemitism on the internet	27	30	21	47	29
Total	65	80	64	109	70

Source: antisemitisme.be, 2016, p. 17

Table 14 shows the location of antisemitic incidents. Many such incidents took place in Brussels and Antwerp, as the bulk of Belgium's Jewish population live in these two cities. The numbers must be interpreted with caution because they reflect the number of incidents, not of victims – a fact that can readily lead to misunderstanding.

7 The first attack fired rocket-propelled grenades at a group of 60 children in Antwerp on 27 July 1980, leading to one death. The second caused the death of three persons and 80 injuries with a car bombing in front of an Antwerp synagogue in September 1981. The third was the gunfire attack at the Great Synagogue of Brussels, in 1982. The fourth was the assassination of Dr Joseph Wybran, president of the CCOJB, in October 1989 (antisémtisme.be, 2015, *Rapport 2014*, p. 20).

Table 14: Location of antisemitic incidents per year, 2011–2015

	Brussels	Antwerp	Gand	Maline	Charleroi	Liège	Ostend	Other locations	Media/ internet	Total
2011	19	14					1	28	30	82
2012	30	10				3		12	26	81
2013	10	22				3		10	19	64
2014	40	15				5		12	33	105
2015	22	9	2	2	1			19	15	70

Source: antisemitisme.be, 2015

Table 15 indicates the number of antisemitic incidents every year by type of target. The numbers include various types of incidents such as verbal attacks and damage to buildings.

Table 15: Target of antisemitic incidents, 2011–2015

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Individuals	21	23	29	28	29
Community buildings	3	5	1	15	2
Public spaces	28	52	34	66	39

Sources: Annual reports from antisemitisme.be, 2015

In data collected by Unia (formerly CECLR), antisemitism is included in the category of racist incidents or speech because antisemitism is condemned by the antiracist law of 1981. In 2015, 53 antisemitic warnings were counted, 20 of which were filed by Unia (Unia, 2016, p. 42). Antisemitic discrimination is rare, but it does occur. Table 16 shows that antisemitic incidents only represent a small proportion of the cases analysed and processed by Unia. Indeed, they represent on average no more than 100 cases per year according to antisemitism.be and a small proportion of the total number of recorded discriminatory incidents. This does not mean that they are not dangerous or unimportant. But it does indicate that antisemitic incidents occur within a larger and, indeed, active context of discriminatory statements and hate crimes, a context that more accurately suggests the level of discrimination and racism in Belgium. Table 16 shows also that not all recorded discriminatory or hate-fuelled incidents lead to legal proceedings. Sometimes there is not enough evidence to file a complaint; on other occasions the legal framework cannot accommodate the nature of the evidence that does exist.

Table 16: Discrimination, hate crimes and hate speech recorded by Unia, 2010–2015

	Incidents recorded	Incidents pursued
2010	3,608	1,343
2011	4,162	1,277
2012	4,224	1,316
2013	3,713	1,406
2014	4,627	1,670
2015	4,454	1,596

Source: Unia, 2016, p. 18

Table 17 provides an overview of the kind and the variety of incidents recorded by Unia. Antisemitic incidents are most frequently categorized as instances of racial discrimination. Because these figures do not distinguish between Islamophobia, Romaphobia, antisemitism or negrophobia, it is difficult to compare the forms and the extent of antisemitism with other types of racism and discrimination.

Table 17: Incidents of discrimination, hate speech and hate crime registered in 2015 by type and domain

	Total	%	Media/ internet	Services	Employment	Education	Life of society	Diverse activities	Police and justice	Welfare	Others/ Unclear
Total	1,748		427	422	375	179	156	68	61	48	12
%			24%	24%	21%	10%	9%	4%	3%	3%	1%
Race	661	38%	204	114	150	44	74	19	41	8	7
Disability	384	22%	2	141	64	90	15	28	10	31	3
Religious view	330	19%	183	26	47	35	23	9	6		1
Sexual orientation	92	5%	22	8	13	2	41	2	2	1	1
Age	80	5%	1	20	46	4		6		3	
Socio-economical	76	4%	2	71	1			1		3	
Health	64	4%	2	23	32	4	1	2	1	1	
Civil state	19	1%		13	4					2	
Political view	14	1%	7	1	4			1	1		
Other criteria	28	2%	6	5	14		2			1	

Source: Unia, 2016, p. 19

4.1 Attitudes towards Jews in society

As their socio-professional integration suggests, Jews are less often discriminated against than are other minorities in Belgium's residential, scholarly and labour markets (Ben-Rafael, 2014). This is in part due to the size of the Jewish population and the status of Jews as an older and more settled migrant group. Yet even if Jews are not stigmatized on the basis of skin colour, Jews who wear signs of their Jewishness, and particularly ultra-orthodox Jews, still find themselves facing discrimination, hate speech and hate crimes. For those influenced by conspiracy theories, Jews continue to be viewed as alien beings whose primary allegiance rests with the State of Israel. Like migrants and their descendants, Jews are suspected of having a strong, even overriding, loyalty to their homeland.

Jews in Belgium are still subject to prejudice, discrimination and antisemitic speech and incidents. Indeed, antisemitism has never completely disappeared. What has changed in recent years is that Jews are no longer the focus of the discourse of the main extreme-right parties in Belgium (Jacobs and Hanquinet, 2006). To some extent, they have been replaced by Muslims in those parties' propaganda (Jacobs and Hanquinet, 2006); at the same time, they remain at the centre of conspiracy theories. Moreover, Jews, along with Muslim youth, are the target of the new radical left (Kotek, 2004; Ben-Rafael, 2014).

Only scattered research exists into contemporary antisemitism in Belgium. Some of the studies we will present address antisemitism as only one aspect of a broader phenomenon under investigation. In the following paragraphs, we present their main objectives and results.

The first study, a survey of antisemitism in the Belgian population, is not exhaustive and mainly focuses on young prople living in large Belgian cities, where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict opened the door to antisemitic speech, prejudice and incidents. The topic was investigated by researchers at the request of the Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Campaign against Racism (CECLR), after protests against the escalation of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2009 saw a new wave of antisemitic slogans (Jacobs et al., 2011). The study was conducted in 2010 in Brussels among four random samples of individuals of Moroccan, Turkish, Congolese and Belgian backgrounds (n: 1508). The researchers noticed 'more negative attitudes towards Jews among self-declared Muslims (n: 791) than among self-declared Christians (n: 330) or atheists (n: 291)' (Jacobs et al., 2011). They show that the attitudes towards Jews are closely linked to religious affiliation. Muslims living in Brussels clearly had more negative feelings towards Jews than did Christians. Of course, these results do not constitute proof that the Muslim population is responsible for every antisemitic act. There is a distinction to be made between attitudes and behaviours.

Another quantitative study about the persistence of racist representations points to the high level of antisemitism in Flemish secondary schools (Elchardus, 2011). Some 30% of pupils expressed negative attitudes towards Jews. Elchardus (2011) notices variation by gender, with boys proving more negative than girls. The type of school attended was also significant. Negative attitudes proved more common in technical and vocational schools than in general schools and among pupils with Catholic and Muslim faiths. Elchardus (2011) also underlines the link between antisemitism and feelings of insecurity.

Research focused on the content of sermons and lectures in the mosques of Brussels has not identified antisemitic remarks. Unfortunately, the sponsors of this research have not published their findings, probably for security reasons.

Finally, an opinion survey (n: 4,733) published in 2017 (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 60) analysing the extent of the Belgian crisis shows that antisemitic views in the Belgian population are still widespread and encompass different kinds of antisemitism. The results are surprising given the small size of the Jewish population in Belgium and the relative absence of Jews from the political agenda. Some 75% of respondents think that Jews are very united, meaning that they see themselves as a people apart. Asked about some widespread antisemitic notions, 49% think that Jews have a special relationship with money, while the same number believe that Belgian Jews are more attached to Israel than they are to Belgium. 46% of the sample think that Jews are richer than the average Belgian; 31% mistrust them as a group and believe that Jews have too much power; 26% think that Jews are too predominant in the media; 21% express a negative view towards Jews living in Belgium; and 18% think that Jews are not Belgian 'like others'. The authors notice that antisemitic attitudes are stronger among people who have less educational capital (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 61). They also notice that antisemitic attitudes correlate with anti-Muslim, anti-Islam and anti-immigrant views. The more people identified with the right in terms of political opinion, the more they expressed antisemitic views. However, antisemitic views also exist among people who situate themselves on the left side of the political spectrum.

4.2 Jews' perceptions of antisemitism

Belgian Jews' perceptions of antisemitism are not well documented or studied to any significant extent. We found only one statistical enquiry on Jews' perceptions of antisemitism. The Israeli sociologist Eliezer Ben-Rafael (2014) carried out quantitative research on several aspects of Jewish identities in Belgium based on the data collected by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2013). The sample was composed of 438 individuals. For 78.6% of the sample, racism is perceived as a significant problem. Religious intolerance is a very big problem for 57.4% of the sample (Ben-Rafael, 2014, p. 75). According to Ben-Rafael, antisemitism in Belgium has increased over time (2014, p. 75).

Table 18: Perceptions of antisemitism among Jews in Belgium (n: 438)

	Big problem	Fairly big	Exists	Little/not	Don't know
Antisemitism	34.5	42.1	19.7	2	1.7
Racism	31.9	46.7	17.9	2.2	1.3
Past five years	A lot	Somehow	Same	Decreased	Don't
Racism increased	39.5	38.6	16.4	2.8	2.6
Antisemitism increased	57	30.3	9.2	1.8	1.7
	Big problem	**Quite big**	**Exists**	**Little/not**	**Don't know**
Anti-Jewish graffiti	21.4	30.1	37.1	6.1	5.2
Desecration of Jewish cemeteries	20.1	20.1	36.5	16.8	6.6

Hostility on the street	34.7	38.4	21.4	3.9	1.5
Media	36.9	33.2	22.4	5.7	1.7
Internet	56.8	27.5	8.5	1.5	5.7
Vandalism of Jewish buildings	2.10	32.8	35.4	5.2	5.7
Five years increase/ decrease	**A lot**	**Somehow**	**Same**	**Decreased**	**Don't know**
In general	59	30	10	1	1
Graffiti	17.9	32.1	32.3	3.1	1.3
Desecration	8.3	21.2	43.9	7.7	19
Hostility on the street	36.7	49	16.8	3.1	3.5
Vandalism	14	32.3	36	4.8	12.9
Media	38.4	30.8	22.3	3.5	5
Political life	20.1	32.3	33.6	5.4	8.5
Internet	59.8	22.5	6.3	1.1	10.3
Antisemitic comments	**Big problem**	**Quite big**	**Exists**	**Little/not**	**Don't know**
Discussion of people	29.3	38.2	24.2	3.7	4.6
On the internet	58.7	24.5	7.6	1.7	7.4
Political speeches	23.8	30.3	32.1	9.2	4.6

Source: Ben-Rafael, 2014, p. 76

The findings of Ben-Rafael (2014) illustrated in Table 18 show Jews' perception of antisemitism. Along with other sources, Ben-Rafael considers the growth of antisemitism to be complex. The increase in physical risks for Jews is obviously a factor in the intensification of people's perceptions of antisemitism. Ben-Rafael notes that 'a majority of respondents also define the people they would name as antisemitic. In this respect, they indicate: those who support a boycott of Israel; who say that a Jew is recognizable by external traits; who would not marry a Jew; and who demonize Israel' (Ben-Rafael, 2014, p. 77). Some 27% of the sample experienced antisemitism in their daily life, having been insulted or harassed due to their Jewishness (Ben-Rafael, 2014, p. 77). To the question 'to what extent the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts on how safe you feel as a Jewish person in Belgium', 69% answered that it had a strong impact, 24% a fair amount, 6% little impact and 1% no impact (Ben-Rafael, 2014, p. 77).

Our qualitative enquiry confirms the trends observed by Ben-Rafael (2014); see section 9, New Empirical Data.

4.3 Summary

- Antisemitic incidents represent only a small proportion of racist incidents, but they still produce physical violence and deaths.
- As for other forms of racism, the internet is an important space for the expression of antisemitism.
- Unlike Islamophobia or Romaphobia, antisemitism doesn't seem to produce employment or residential discrimination.

5 New Empirical Data

5.1 Jewish perceptions of antisemitism

We observed a great diversity in the perception and fear of antisemitism among the representatives of the Jewish organizations we met. The representatives varied in their framing of Jewish identity and their definition and perception of antisemitism, and those interpretations and attitudes changed over time. Nor did the interviewees agree about Zionism or the legitimate boundaries of criticism regarding Israeli military policy. In other words, they differed in their vision of Jewish identity and in their views on the state of Israel and its policy in the occupied territories. Consequently, they do not share the same perceptions of the occurrence and the rise of antisemitism, and they do not react in the same way to antisemitic incidents or insults. Nonetheless, they do agree on one point: that a change has occurred in recent years.

First, the interviewees observed changes in the occurrence of antisemitism. They point to new figures on the extreme right: the populist politician Laurent Louis and the French humourist Dieudonné, whose web videos, with Alain Soral, are well known in French-speaking Belgium. Their discourse mixing antisemitic prejudice and fake news seems to be diffused among young people and contributes to the trivialization of antisemitic speech. Second, the interviewees observed that antisemitism is not a central feature of the discourse of the main extreme-right parties, especially the Flemish Vlaams Belang party (VB). On the contrary, this party presents itself as a friend of the Jewish organizations and holds Jews up as an example of good integration compared with other migrant groups, especially second- and third-generation North African migrants (Jacobs and Hanquinet, 2006). Some interviewees perceived this shift in VB discourse but expressed doubts about whether it truly signalled a disappearance of antisemitism in the ideology of this party and other extreme-right groups.

Changes in the expression of the antisemitism are also at work in the political left, especially in respect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some examples were mentioned during the interviews. The 2012 act of protest led by Souhail Chichah, a political activist and Assistant Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), was mentioned as an example of the diffusion of antisemitism among students and in the academic sphere. During a talk by a French journalist, Caroline Fourest, protestors interrupted talk with shouts of ‘Burqa Blabla’ in an attempt to denounce her alleged Islamophobia. The protest also featured some antisemitic slogans. The interviewees also mentioned Abou Jaja, a political activist and long-time editor of a Flemish newspaper who defended the political and cultural empowerment of ethnically discriminated groups (Jacobs, 2005). Abou Jaja has regularly attacked Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories and expressed ambiguous opinions about the Israeli victims of the Hamas attacks. Finally, the interviewees noticed a rise in antisemitism amongst some youngsters, especially those of North African descent. This perception is widely diffused and is based on experiences of training and activities promoted by Jewish organizations in/with secondary schools. A trainer observed that the antisemitism at work in secondary schools is characterized by old Christian prejudices and conspiracy theories and is influenced by opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to social workers, young people’s antisemitic language suggests that their antisemitism is not necessarily the product of their familial socialization and transmission but rather stems from the diffusion of Dieudonné’s antisemitic views, through peers and the internet.

The diversity of the Jewish organizations is reflected in their varied perceptions of antisemitism and of the political landscape within which antisemitism seems to be on the rise. Let us take the example of the nationalist and populist party, the Nieuw Vlaamse Alliance (NVA), which has become the primary electoral force in Flemish politics at the local and regional levels. The NVA's position on Jews has evolved, with the party's president, Bart de Wever, publicly changing his position. In 2007, he criticized statements made by the former mayor of Antwerp, who apologized to the Jewish population for the city's actions during World War II, when municipal authorities collaborated in the deportation of Jews (Belga, 2007). But since 2012, when he became Antwerp's mayor, de Wever has stepped back from that position, meeting with the city's Holocaust survivors, commending the Jews for their integration into city life and expressing support for Israel. (Brener, 2010). This shift has been recognized by some Flemish Jewish organizations. Others, especially francophone organizations, are more cautious towards the NVA. While refraining from categorizing the NVA as an antisemitic party, they nonetheless recall the role of the Flemish nationalist movement during World War II, when it expressed support for the deportation of the Jewish population and for certain public figures (including collaborators) who expressed antisemitic views (Zomersztajn, n.d.).

Some Jewish community organizations find antisemitic leanings among people or organizations on the left of the political spectrum, such as Michel Collomb or the radical left movement Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS), which has suggested that Israeli policies in the occupied territories are comparable to those of the Nazi regime. The Amitiés Belgo-Palestiniennes (Belgo-Palestinian Friendship) is also singled out, as is Oxfam-Belgium in light of its past support of the boycott of Israeli products. Yet while some Jewish organizations consider those figures and associations to be antisemitic, representatives of progressive Jewish organizations disagree.

For many interviewees, criticism of Israel's legitimacy should itself be considered antisemitic. Some secular and religious organizations believe that antisemitism shapes the regularity and tone of much criticism of Israel's policies in the Palestinian territories, particularly the frequent references to Nazism. The sheer vehemence of that criticism, they argue, provides evidence of double standards, since it is not directed at other regimes (such as those in Turkey or Syria) that implement similar policies in contested territories. The rise of antisemitic incidents during periods of escalating violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict gives some credibility to this perception. In addition, some Jewish associations report being asked about their positions on Israel and Palestine when negotiating partnerships on projects entirely unrelated to Israeli policy, leading some to refuse to discuss the issue of Israel at all.

The perception that antisemitism is on the rise, voiced by many interviewees, has been affected by a range of factors. Since the second Intifada in the 2000s, security at buildings housing Jewish organizations has been strengthened because of the increased risk of terrorism. The fact that public authorities asked Jewish organizations to bear the expense of monitoring those buildings' entrances is cited as evidence of inequality in the level of protection provided by the state. (More recently, however, at times of heightened terrorist threats, police and military patrols were posted in front of Jewish organizations' buildings.) Another sort of security measure has been implemented in Brussels,

where Jews were advised by public authorities to avoid displaying signs of their Jewishness because of the risk of physical violence.

Such heightening of protective measures has provoked anxiety and fear among Belgium's Jewish population, leading to widespread debate on the form such security measures should take. Our interviewees agreed that current procedures reveal gaps in domestic security policy. Potential targets have been asked to adapt to threats and to contribute to their own safety, with consequent limits on their freedom of expression and belief.

Some representatives of Jewish organizations assert that antisemitic speech has been normalized, both in the media and in daily life. They point to a lack of reaction to such speech in political discourse and policy, an absence of condemnation that amounts to implicit acceptance. Such laxity is particularly evident in cases of antisemitic remarks made by marginalized people of foreign origin, as well as statements drawing comparison between Israel and Nazi Germany. Clearly, slogans calling for the death of Jews or comparing Israeli policies with Nazi crimes minimize the horrors perpetrated by Nazism and can be hurtful for the descendants of the Shoah's victims. While not opposed to criticism of Israeli policy, our interviewees pointed out that such criticism of territorial occupation is not as prevalent toward other states implementing similar policies. The fact that Israel is the only state targeted by such criticisms is problematic. In many ways, presenting Israel as an exception simply reformulates and reinforces longstanding antisemitic perceptions of Jews as 'other'.

A third factor identified as contributing to the rise of antisemitism and intensifying a sense of threat is the arrival of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) migrants. Indeed, some representatives of secular and religious Jewish associations believe that new migrants from political states where antisemitism permeates social life and state policy, and particularly those from MENA and Muslim countries, could eventually intensify antisemitic behaviours and the expression of antisemitic views. Informing this belief is the fear that the antisemitism expressed by earlier MENA migrants who came to Belgium in the late twentieth century will be transmitted to the new arrivals, compounding the anti-Jewish sentiments they may have absorbed in their country of origin. This view, however, is not supported by any direct experience of the new migrants. No Jewish organization was officially involved in the spontaneous support of asylum seekers during the asylum crisis of 2015 in Belgium: while some groups did participate in collective initiatives, their Jewish identity was not specifically underlined. Therefore, no antisemitic behaviour was observed during those activities. The prevalence of these fears reflects not recent experience, but lingering trauma: memories of past antisemitic incidents and of terrorist attacks on Jewish organizations in Belgium and France. Projecting those fears onto the new arrivals is a form of generalization which itself bears traces of ethnic prejudice. While such bias does not necessarily produce patterns of physical avoidance, it does foster mistrust in intergroup relationships.

At the same time, not all representatives of Jewish organizations share this prejudice. Some interviewees pointed out that citizens do not necessarily support the values of their native society and state; as a consequence, they do not greet the new arrivals with fear. Instead, they have faith in the process of socialization: if new migrants remain in Belgium, simply by their interactions

with state bureaucracy they will absorb the values of Belgian society, which are not antisemitic. A few interviewees expressed hope that future citizenship courses in compulsory education and integration will facilitate the learning of Belgian values.

The perception of antisemitism still influences the expression of the Jewish identity in Belgium. The past, especially memories of the Shoah, still produces fears of physical violence. Because some older Jews are still afraid of being stigmatized, they do not want to tell their children that they are Jews. To some extent, the fear of physical aggression makes itself felt on a daily basis. Indeed, some interviewees living in Brussels, those who practise Judaism and atheists alike, recognize that they refrain from displaying signs of their Jewishness – not only the kippah, but also clothes with Hebraic signs – because of the risk of physical threat and/or violence.

Some Jewish organizations in Brussels and Antwerp believe that growing numbers of Jews are leaving Belgium because of pervasive antisemitism and risks of physical violence. In order to avoid a hostile academic environment, some Jewish students with financial means choose to study abroad. Once they finish their studies they generally do not return to Belgium. Indeed, we heard reports that some Jews no longer feel comfortable and secure in some public schools and at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), the French-speaking free university of Brussels. Instead, they choose to study abroad. That trend fuels our interviewees' perception that public authorities underestimate antisemitism. At the same time, some argue that Jews who decide to leave Belgium for Israel are prompted less by antisemitism than by business and financial concerns. Israel has adopted fiscal incentives to stimulate such migration: Jews who settle in Israel within the framework of the Aliyah (the policy of migration to Israel for Jews) pay less in inheritance and wealth taxes than they would have in Belgium. Along with the decline of the Belgian diamond industry, those incentives, far more than anti-Semitism, explain Jewish migration to Israel. As for the public schools, antisemitism alone does not explain the alleged decline in Jewish enrolment: the deteriorating quality of Belgian education and the high quality of education provided in Jewish schools should also be mentioned. Nonetheless, no one denies that antisemitic incidents also play a part.

The varied perceptions of antisemitism and its rise also shape assessments of the existing framework for combatting it. Some secular and religious Jewish associations believe that the official indicators used to identify Holocaust denial and antisemitic incidents are too weak, leaving too many incidents undocumented and consequently uncondemned. That is why they criticize the low number of legal proceedings initiated by Unia. Its recent refusal to prosecute the Belgian caricaturist, whose antisemitic caricature was awarded a prize at an international Holocaust cartoon contest in Iran, is one of its many controversial decisions. These severe criticisms come at a time when Unia is being weakened politically. Indeed, the NVA, the Flemish separatist party, which is a member of the Federal government, attacks Unia in order to prove that federal and interfederal institutions do not work. Unia, the NVA claims, simply fails in its appointed task, leaving both the mainstream public and the well-integrated minorities without sufficient protection.[8] Moreover, they point out the weakness of current political reactions to antisemitic incidents, demanding that

8 « La NVA veut un Unia flamand ce qui ne plait pas au MR », Libre Belgique, 27th February 2017, available on : www.lalibre.be/actu/politique-belge/la-n-va-veut-un-unia-flamand-ce-qui-ne-plait-pas-au-mr-58b3d709cd70ce397f2d1365.

each such incident be met by strong political and public condemnation. Yet other interviewees, representing both Zionist and anti-Zionist organizations, argue that existing policy tools for responding to antisemitism are sufficient. The long history of antisemitism means that it cannot be simply legislated out of existence. Dialogue and openness to others should be the priority of all seeking to prevent and combat it, they suggest.

Finally, all the Jewish organizations interviewed are aware that Jews face less discrimination than other ethnic groups and migrants, who face stigmatization in education, housing and employment. Several interviewees said that it was easier to be Jewish than to be Muslim or a MENA migrant – at least in terms of the immediate experience of discrimination, though not necessarily in terms of stigmatization. Some also expressed an awareness that the stigmatization of Muslims could lead to the return of stigmatization of Jews.

5.2 Perspectives on and responses to the research question

The core research question 'what (if any) has been the impact of MENA migrants, both immigrants and refugees, on antisemitic attitudes, propaganda, political mobilization and hate crime in Belgium since 2011?' was itself considered biased by several representatives of organizations helping new migrants and also by some Jewish organizations. For people dealing with new migrants on a daily basis and providing them with administrative assistance, the topic of antisemitism is not relevant. They almost never see it in their daily lives, since it has not been one of the worries of new migrants currently arriving in Belgium. As a result, the topic of our research took them by surprise. They agreed to participate in the interviews because they hoped it would prove useful in fighting prejudice toward new migrants in Belgian society.

5.3 MENA migrants and integration

The semi-structured interviews we carried out with recent MENA migrants and representatives of organizations handling their cases highlight the difficult path of settlement for new migrants in Belgium. This path is made up of multiple administrative stages in which migrants must prove the legitimacy of their presence. New migrants live in situations where they face racism and discrimination not only in their daily relationships with members of the receiving society, but also in the bureaucratic entanglements of immigration policy rules. Such entanglements amount to institutional discrimination. For instance, the priority given to Syrian asylum seekers, which is statistically verified, comes at the expense of other asylum seekers fleeing war or areas of extreme danger. Indeed, such asylum seekers view this administrative priority as an injustice because they no less than Syrians are fleeing war zones. Other rules such as those of the Dublin Convention require asylum seekers to return to the location where they were first registered. These rules foment competition between new migrants, which intensifies prejudice and racism. The interviews reveal the institutional racism they feel during the asylum procedure and the racist views that it can produce.

Because the asylum procedures do not create a welcoming environment, the 'welcoming' classes for children and youngsters, held during the first year of schooling in Belgium and intended to teach basic French or Flemish, are deemed

by the migrants themselves to be ghettos. Far from conveying a sense of welcome, the classes make them feel very different and isolated from the hosting society.

Our interviews with migrant assistance organizations suggest that the level of stigmatization experienced by new migrants in their everyday lives depends on where they live. Those organizations located in small towns report that the new migrants under their care commonly receive signs of solidarity from local residents.

These newcomers want to integrate into the host society. Middle Eastern and East Asian new migrants are baffled by comparisons with North African second- and third-generation migrants because they feel themselves to be different from them. Some interviewees explain that new MENA migrants differentiate themselves from second- and third-generation North African and Turkish migrants, claiming that religion is the only thing that they have in common. They express their willingness to learn the language quickly in order to find a job, which they consider to be the main way to integrate into the host society. Trainers note that before language and citizenship courses became compulsory, migrants often requested them.

5.4 MENA migrants and antisemitism

The extent of antisemitic views among new migrants is not known. The interviews with recent MENA migrants and representatives of associations and agencies dealing with them indicate that antisemitic views are rarely expressed. Clearly, the context of their interactions with social workers and low-level bureaucrats does not readily provide the opportunity to express antisemitic thoughts or ideas. Yet social workers at residence centres for new migrants, who interact with the new arrivals more frequently and informally, do not report antisemitic speech either. These social workers explain that the conversations revolve around the problems and obstacles in migrants' lives and their hopes for the future. What racist language social workers do hear among the new arrivals mostly targets other migrants, people from different countries and regions than their own.

Within the interviews carried out with MENA migrants, the only antisemitic opinion expressed came from a non-Muslim migrant. This occurred after the interviewee was asked if he or she would accept the help of a Jewish organization in Belgium. The interviewee answered that he/she could not trust Jews because of the content of the Bible and therefore would refuse the help of a Jewish association. Another new migrant from a sub-Saharan Muslim country did not seem to know who Jews were. This person left his/her country of origin because of the threat on his/her life and he/she has been a victim of racism, including violent incidents, in Belgium.

A director of a migrant centre told us that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is sometimes discussed by the residents of the centre. He has never heard antisemitic remarks but did once hear that a Middle Eastern asylum seeker would have liked to wait for the end of the war in his country in a refugee camp in Israel in order to be closer to home. Another social worker reported that an Iraqi woman making use of her organization's services fell in love with a Jewish social worker and had asked her and others if it would be better if she removed her headscarf in order to appeal to him.

When contacts between Jews and new migrants occur at the interpersonal level, religious affiliation is often not evident, because a lot of Jews do not exhibit signs of their Jewishness. As a consequence, the arrival of new migrants from MENA countries has not contributed to the rise of antisemitism in Belgian society.

5.5 Summary

- The perception and experience of antisemitism are present in the Jewish population.
- The perception and fear of antisemitism varies among the representatives of Jewish associations.
- The perception and fear of antisemitism contribute to the expression of Jewish identity.
- The arrival of recent migrants has intensified fears of antisemitism in different parts of the Jewish population.
- The fear, perception and experience of antisemitism among Jews can provoke a form of ethnic prejudice towards new migrants, a preconception that MENA migrants are likely to hold antisemitic views.
- New migrants are keen to integrate but are confronted with numerous difficulties.
- The extent of antisemitic views among new migrants is not known. Concerns and conversations revolve around the problems and obstacles in migrants' lives and their hopes for the future.
- At the time of writing, we have not found a link between recent MENA migrants and antisemitism, except for one non-Muslim migrant who expressed his/her prejudice about Jews during a semi-structured interview. In his/her daily life this prejudice results in the avoidance of Jews.
- Racist language among the new migrants tends to target the lifestyles of migrants from other countries and regions.

6 Public Discourse

In Belgian public discourse, the topics of migrants and refugees on the one hand and antisemitism on the other are the focus of separate and very different debates. Discussions about migrants and refugees are framed by migration and integration policies. Indeed, their number, their beliefs, their values and their habits are seen by some political parties as a threat to social cohesion in Belgium. Antisemitism, in contrast, is described in terms of racism, discrimination and the impact of revisionism or Holocaust denial. The link between these topics goes undetected in the media and in political spheres: they are treated separately.

Several public campaigns have been created to combat prejudices against migrants and refugees in the Belgian population in the context of the asylum crisis in Belgium and in Europe.[9] These campaigns have also attempted to deconstruct the prejudices against migrants and refugees in the political rhetoric of extreme-right parties and representatives of right-wing parties of the federal majority. However, in Flanders, there is a stronger anti-immigrant political environment than there is in French-speaking areas (Alanya et al., 2015). For nationalist parties, the inclusion of newcomers 'could reduce the cultural homogeneity needed to legitimize the nation-building process' (Adam, 2013, p. 550). For instance, some political representatives of the NVA, including representatives charged with addressing integration and migration issues, frequently express prejudices about recent migrants or refugees.[10] Sometimes their remarks carry racist overtones that highlight ideological continuities between the NVA and the VB. In Belgium, negative comments about migrants and refugees tend to be expressed by right-wing and extreme-right parties. However, antisemitism has decreased in the propaganda of extreme-right parties, especially in Flanders with the VB (Jacobs and Hanquinet, 2006). Without completely disappearing, the antisemitism of this extreme-right party has diminished because of its focus on recent migrants and the identification of Jews as a 'model of good integration' in comparison with Muslim migrants. The arrival and diversification of migrants have led to a decreased focus on Jews.

Other forms of antisemitism also exist in the Belgian public sphere. Some journalists, public figures and politicians express antisemitism through remarks or clichés, mainly when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is discussed. Antisemitic reflexions are occasionally expressed by elected or public figures of every traditional political party. Frequently, Israeli policy towards the Palestinian territories is criticized by comparing it with the policies of fascist or Nazi regimes. Indeed, antisemitism is not widespread in the political and public sphere, apart from its deployment in discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The same could be said about antisemitism in Belgian media. Some journalists writing for esteemed newspapers and news magazines are well known for their frequent and mechanical remarks about the loyalty of Jews to Israel and their acceptance of Israeli policies.

9 'Les préjugés feraient bien de rester chez eux' (Prejudices would stay at home) is an example of public campaign of prejudice against refugees' prevention: www.cire.be/sensibilisation/outils-pedagogiques/refugies-etrangers-petit-guide-anti-prejuges. Other campaigns are led in this perspective.

10 www.lesoir.be/1475792/article/actualite/belgique/politique/2017-04-05/selon-un-echevin-anversois-n-va-refugies-seraient-mieux-campagne.

Finally, in the political sphere, there is a growing awareness that something more could be done to combat antisemitism. Several interviewees who had connections with political parties cited discussions of antisemitism within the parties after the terrorist attacks in Belgium, in order to improve understanding of antisemitism and to better support the Jewish population.

6.1 Summary

- Antisemitism in Belgium has not disappeared.
- Antisemitic remarks,[11] or perceived antisemitic remarks, still occur in the public sphere. Indeed, there are occurrences of racism and antisemitism even from the representatives of the main political parties and members of the executive governments.[12]
- Social media is an important place where antisemitism, racism and prejudices about migrants are expressed.
- Migrant and ethnic groups are still stigmatized.

11 See the descriptions made in the annual reports of antisemitisme.be

12 In 2012, Reynders, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that Molenbeek was abroad.

7 Integration of Second and Subsequent Generations of MENA Migrants

So far, we have focused on recent migrants. Are there lessons to be learnt from the experiences and attitudes of second- or third-generation migrants? In Belgium, second- and third-generation MENA migrants are mainly of Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds. Since statistics based on ethnicity and religion are not permitted in Belgium, quantitative studies of second and third generation migrants are based on the nationality and family name of those who acquire Belgian nationality or the birth location of the mother.

7.1 Context

Integration of migrants is a two-way process: Belgian society is not very tolerant. In a 2015 opinion survey (n: 4,734), 66% of respondents stated that there are too many immigrants in Belgium and that they feel invaded (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 44). The survey demonstrated a fear of Muslims and an overestimation of the size of this group in Belgian society. Muslims and recent migrants are believed to be the instigators when problems involving migrants occur (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 47). 63% of the respondents viewed Muslims and recent migrants as a threat to Belgian identity and were convinced that they refuse to integrate, seeking instead to impose their beliefs and lifestyle on the host society (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 48). These anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant opinions decrease among those with more education and are higher among people who identify more with right and extreme-right parties. The same survey (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 52) shows that those who express anti-Muslim views also express antisemitic feelings. The authors interpret these views as a rejection of those deemed 'other' and an embrace of an essentialist and xenophobic conception of identity (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 58).

The distinction between 'true Belgians' and 'Belgians on paper' is growing. 56% think that migrant descents will never become 'true Belgians' (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 64). For 63% of the 'true Belgians' questioned in the survey, the Muslim community in Belgium constitutes a threat to Belgian identity, while 12% consider it is a source of cultural richness and 25% think it is neither one nor the other (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 112). These views are expressed at a time of crisis in Belgian society, evidenced in a low level of trust in the main social institutions, in elites and in the future. As a consequence, Muslims in Belgium feel stigmatized, discriminated against and reduced to their 'national and religious' identity (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 117). This feeling is also observed in qualitative studies (Jamoulle and Mazzocchetti, 2011). 78% of the Muslims questioned in the survey have the feeling that they are still seen as foreigners in Belgium, 68% feel that they are more marginalized since the terrorist attacks in Belgium and 72% feel segregated in certain urban areas (Scheuer et al., 2017, p. 116).

7.2 Civic participation

In terms of civic participation, people with migrant origins have relatively good access to the political sphere. Research on this topic, focused predominantly on Brussels, suggests that the political participation of people with migrant origins was facilitated by several features during the 1990s and 2000s.

First, the reform of access to Belgian nationality has enhanced the political participation of people with migrant origins not only as voters, but also as candidates for political office. Indeed, the political representatives in Brussels

include a large number of people with migrant backgrounds (Jacobs and al., 2002; Delwit, 2006; Zibouh, 2010; Rea et al., 2010). Such political inclusion can be seen in the main political parties. Dirk Jacobs has argued that the last few decades have seen a growing professionalization of political representatives with a migration background (Jacobs, 2005). In Brussels, 150,000 individuals acquired Belgian nationality between 1988 and 2002. 26% of the Brussels Regional population is foreign and 42% have migrant origins. In 1995, in the Region of Brussels, four regional representatives out of 75 had migrant backgrounds, three had Moroccan origins and one was of Tunisian origin (Rea et al., 2010). This number has grown over time. In 1999, there were 18 deputies with migrant backgrounds out of 72 French-speaking regional representatives and one out of 17 Flemish deputies. At the Brussels municipal level, 12 representatives with Moroccan, Turkish and Congolese backgrounds became aldermen. In 2006, 138 out of over 663 locally elected representatives in Brussels had foreign backgrounds. In 2004, the Brussels regional and the French-speaking community governments each contained a minister with non-EU origins. However, their presence at the executive level is proportionally less significant, and on the electoral lists and executive mandates they often appear strategically in order to encourage the ethnic vote. Moreover, racist remarks are sometimes made about them or their origins. Access to Belgian nationality for migrants and their children is seen as one of the primary factors behind the strength of the left parties in the Region of Brussels (Rea et al., 2015). Here young people with foreign backgrounds and French-language secondary education express specific electoral preferences that amount to an ethnic vote (Teney and Jacobs, 2009). Youngsters with Moroccan, Turkish and Congolese backgrounds vote for leftist parties at a rate that is above average.

Second, in 2004, the right to vote in municipal elections was extended to non-EU foreigners. Whereas for Belgian citizens the vote is compulsory, EU and non-EU foreigners living in Belgium have to register on electoral lists in order to obtain voting rights. The acquisition of such rights in municipal elections did not lead to the strong electoral participation of foreigners living in Belgium. There is a high rate of electoral abstention. For instance, at the municipal level in Brussels, only 6,622 out of 42,298 non-EU foreigners living in Brussels completed their registration on the electoral list for the 2006 elections (Rea et al., 2010, p. 695). Nonetheless, non-EU foreigners' electoral municipal participation is higher than those of EU foreigners in the same elections. Out of 138,482 eligible EU foreigners, only 18,692 participated in the municipal elections.

7.3 Socio-economic integration

The employment rate of migrants who arrived through asylum seeker procedures between 2000 and 2010 is low and does not exceed the 40% rate for those who arrived earlier (Rea and Wets, 2014). Refugees are less integrated into the labour market than migrants who arrived through the family reunification procedure. Most migrants begin as manual workers and only 21% reach white-collar positions after several years of experience in the labour market. In comparison with other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, asylum seekers' and refugees' participation in the labour market is lower in Belgium. To understand their future employment prospects, it is instructive to draw lessons from the employment situation of the second and third generations of MENA migrants.

A number of studies show that second and third migrant generations, especially those from Mediterranean, African and Middle East countries, experience discrimination in the school system (Jacobs and Rea, 2007), often being relegated to vocational education, and face similar discrimination when seeking jobs and housing. Socio-economic monitoring (CECLR, 2013, pp. 301–302) confirms that people from non-EU countries, especially persons from African countries, remain in weaker positions in the labour market than people originating from the receiving society or EU countries. This difference is clear in low wages, high rates of unemployment and an overrepresentation of people with foreign origin among the beneficiaries of social incomes. Several social scientists underline the ethnic gap at school and in the labour market (Jacobs and Rea, 2007; Vandezande et al., 2011). Indeed, ethnic penalties are at work for different socio-demographic variables. The ethnic gap is associated with negative attitudes of the autochthonous population towards people with migrant origins (Elchardus, 2011; Scheuer et al., 2017) and are not simply due to the migrants' own difficulties with language, training or integration.

Migrants are subject to ethnic and racial discrimination in several sectors. Many young people of foreign origin are impoverished and socially marginalized, 'estranged from the society'. Indeed, in the deprived areas of Brussels, they feel unfairly treated by the police and discriminated against at school and in the labour market. Moreover, the areas where they live suffer from a long-term lack of public investment. Among the second generation, Moroccan people experience more discrimination than Turkish people (Vandezande et al., 2011, p. 5). The stigmatization they all experience is felt day and night, when walking the street and when looking for a job. Discrimination by the police is perceived as being stronger (more prevalent?) in Brussels than in Antwerp. Socio-economic discrimination is linked to discrimination in the public domain (Vandezande et al., 2011, p. 7). For Moroccan as well as for Turkish young people of the second generation, women experience and perceive less discrimination than men. The authors noticed that greater participation in various subdomains leads to a greater awareness of group discrimination.

7.4 Social integration

Some cases of antisemitic episodes were recounted during the interviews in relation to the second and third generations of migrants in Belgium. For instance, antisemitic views were sometimes expressed during training and visits to World War II memorial sites and monuments. Some professors claimed it was difficult to teach certain subjects, such as Darwinist theory or the Shoah, during history classes. Pupils with foreign origins also expressed dissatisfaction because Belgian colonization and the benefits of labour immigration are missing in history courses (Manço et al., 2013). A social worker in a central neighbourhood in Brussels which holds some Jewish monuments and a great concentration of people with foreign origin told the authors that some neighbourhood youngsters believe that local synagogues represent Israel's attempt to control the area. This anecdote suggests that some youngsters with migrant origins adhere to conspiratorial antisemitic theories to interpret the traces of the Jewish presence in Brussels. Clearly, such antisemitic views are held by a very vulnerable social group, and they are not widespread. They emerge from a specific social context, in neighbourhoods and schools where people with migrant origins are concentrated and the

living conditions are poor. Moreover, Jews are not the only groups towards which racist prejudices are expressed. Roma migrants are constantly the subject of racist language and treated as inferiors.

Jews are not the only group whose contacts with young second- or third-generation MENA migrants are shaped by racist prejudices and attitudes: interethnic contacts are also coloured by racism, for example involving people from stigmatized migrant groups (Jamoulle and Mazzocchetti, 2011). For instance, people with Moroccan origin have prejudices against people with Congolese origin and vice versa. Mixed couples are disapproved of by their families and are subjected to unwelcome remarks from strangers when walking in the street. The fear of stigmatization haunts members of weak social groups. From this perspective, racism should be interpreted as a facet of domination.

7.5 Identity and belonging

Because of Belgium's institutional framework and its impact on scientific research funding, there are no studies of national identity at the national scale. Therefore, the research presented in this section is based on samples from specific social groups and smaller scales corresponding to the territory of the subnational entities in which the research teams are located. The data and the studies presented in this section offer insight into the identity and the feeling of national belonging of the second and later generations of migrants.

A comparison of the level of national and European identification among Turkish immigrants and Belgian pupils (n: 1,629) leaving Flemish primary school shows that native Belgian pupils have a higher level of national and European identification than pupils with Turkish roots (Agirdag et al., 2016, p. 294). But pupils with Turkish origin identify more with Europe than with Belgium. The study shows that while national identification may not be linked to educational achievement, European identification does link to this variable for Turkish pupils. The ethnic variables such as language use, religiosity or interethnic friendships also play a role in identification. Being segregated on the spatial plan, second and subsequent generations of MENA migrant express a strong neighbourhood identity (Jamoulle and Mazzocchetti, 2011; Perrin and Martiniello, 2014).

7.6 Cultural integration

Allison Harell (2010, p. 408) defines tolerance as 'traditionally understood to imply restraint when confronted with a group or practice found objectionable'. Political tolerance refers 'to the willingness to refrain from preventing people from expressing their disliked opinions, lifestyles, and preferences of world views'. There are only a few studies on tolerance among people with migrant backgrounds (Hanquinet et al., 2006). These studies focus mainly on young people and do not necessarily allow for the distinction between Belgians and individuals with foreign origin. Moreover, levels of tolerance are measured by focusing on indicators such as attitudes towards homosexuals, hate speech, minority groups, antisemitism, etc. For these reasons, studies of attitudes to tolerance do not cover the entire Belgian population and only give insights into the attitudes of the second and later generations of migrants. These studies focus on representations and opinions but not on practice and behaviour.

As mentioned above, in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an academic study conducted in 2010 among four random samples of individuals of Moroccan, Turkish, Congolese and Belgian backgrounds in Brussels (n: 1 508) highlights 'more negative attitudes towards Jews among self-declared Muslims (n: 791) than among self-declared Christians (n: 330) or atheists (n: 291)' (Jacobs et al., 2011). The attitudes towards Jews form a significant effect of religious affiliation. Muslims living in Brussels clearly had more negative feelings towards Jews than did Christians. Of course, these results do not constitute proof that the Muslim population is responsible for antisemitic incidents.

In regard to attitudes towards homosexuals, Hooghe et al. (2010) found that youngsters with foreign origin have a more negative attitude than the average population of the same age. Teney and Subramanian (2010) analyses these attitudes in the Region of Brussels in 2007, when they interviewed, via questionnaires, 3,121 pupils in secondary education in the capital. If the results seem to confirm that people with migrant roots are highly prejudiced against homosexuals, they also demonstrate that cultural explanations are much too simplistic. 'The role of social norms, the identification process, and the experience of institutional discrimination due to group membership can, to a great extent, explain why youngsters of foreign origin are more prejudiced against lesbians and gay men than Belgians' (Teney and Subramanian, 2010, p. 169). In other words, the process of integration and the attitude of the members of the receiving society contribute to shaping these more negative attitudes.

7.7 Stigmatization and its consequences

On the basis of their skin colour and their weaker position in Belgium society, MENA second- or third-generation migrants are categorized as dangerous classes. Such stigmatization leads to stronger police and security controls and discrimination in education, in the labour market and in the housing market. This stigmatization is also an obstacle to obtaining citizenship. In the case of second and further generations of Moroccan, Turkish and Congolese migrants, one sees in a minority of migrants the phenomenon of (in Erving Goffman's phrase) reverse stigmatization, which consists of taking stigmatized features as a source of pride. This reverse stigmatization could lead to the formation of group identity among youths or a stronger religious commitment (Jamoulle and Mazzocchetti, 2011). Moreover, current fears of terrorist attacks further reinforce stigmatization, with young people of MENA origins suspected not just of delinquency but of terrorism as well.

8 State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses

8.1 Existing mechanisms for monitoring and combating antisemitism

In addition to established devices for monitoring antisemitic, racist and discriminatory incidents, several public policies have been implemented to reduce the occurrence of such incidents. Because of the federal structure of the Belgian state, it is necessary to look at the different governmental levels and institutions – the federal level, the regional level and the communitarian level – to outline the main features of Belgian antiracist and antidiscriminatory policy. Public action in this domain relies on both preventive and repressive measures.

At the federal level, several devices have been implemented. The federal and autonomous structure, Unia, formerly the CECLR, has been in charge of work against discrimination and racism since 1993. It functions (to quote its own self-description) as 'an independent public institution which combats discrimination and promotes equal opportunities. This is done in a spirit of dialogue, cooperation and respect.'[13] Unia has several remits.[14] First, it is charged with combatting different kinds of discrimination (racism, religious or philosophical beliefs, disability, age, sexual orientation) in different sectors (employment, education, housing, goods and services, the internet, etc.). It also promotes awareness and prevention of discrimination. Thirdly, it gives advices to victims or their representatives on whether or not to seek legal redress, and it is able to press charges and seek settlement on victims' behalf. Fourthly, it examines the current legislation and formulates policy recommendations. Finally, it is tasked with monitoring the facts of discrimination and producing statistics. Unia's publications draw upon these statistics and scientific studies.

In prosecuting discrimination and hate crime, Unia follows the legal framework established by three key laws. First, the law against racism adopted on 30 July 1981 recognizes specific aggravating circumstances for crimes motivated by racism and xenophobia. The legal meaning of racism is hostility based on presumed race, skin colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, nationality, religious beliefs or language. Second, the law of 23 March 1995 prohibits negating, playing down, justifying or approving the genocide of the Nazi regime. Since then a series of revisions have facilitated the law's implementation and extended its reach (Grandjean, 2011). A revision in 1999 prohibited persons condemned under this law from exercising certain political rights (Grandjean, 2011). Moreover, the revision confirmed that legal action can be taken by Unia and other associations tasked with defending the moral interests and the honour of the Nazis' victims. In 2004, a further reform of the law aimed to recognise other genocides, namely the Jewish, Armenian and Rwandese genocides, and other crimes against humanity. Third, the antidiscrimination law of 7 May 2007, revised in 2013, prohibits and punishes discrimination based on race, nationality, skin colour, ethnic origin, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, philosophical convictions, religious beliefs, language, health status, disability, physical features, genetic features and social origin.[15] This law also condemns incitement to hate, discrimination and violence. As mentioned above, Unia has a vigilance committee dedicated

13 http://unia.be/en.

14 Information retrieved from: http://unia.be/en.

15 www.belgium.be/fr/justice/victime/plaintes_et_declarations/discrimination.

to combating anti-Semitism, a group composed of representatives of Jewish organizations (CCOJB, CCIB, FJO), homeland security, the equal opportunities departments and justice officials. The vigilance committee analyses the evolution of antisemitic incidents.

Educational activities about World War II, the Resistance and the Shoah are organized in public and free schools, primary as well as secondary, sometimes with the financial support of the public authorities. For instance, training on racism and antisemitism takes place in schools and includes visits to the Breendonck Fort, trips to extermination camps and so forth. On 13 March 2009, the French community (one of Belgium's subnational entities mentioned above) adopted a decree mandating the transmission of the memory of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and resistance and protest movements against the regimes that committed these crimes. Training projects that include goals of combatting antisemitism, racism and prejudice are also funded through the policies of popular education, migrant integration and equal opportunities.

The public authorities and political institutions have developed new policy tools for preventing and condemning antisemitism and other forms of racism, xenophobia and discrimination and for recognizing the damage they cause. In 2010 the Conference on Interculturality (p. 84) pointed out that the law against Holocaust denial and revisionism may constrain the free expression of opinion, but denial and revisionism threaten democracy by rehabilitating racist ideology and by offending the memory of the victims of genocide and their descendants. It argued that it is 'not sufficient to contest the reality of the Jewish genocide in itself, which is punishable, but the fact of encouraging hatred of Jews or antisemitism by expressing the idea, for instance, that Jews invented their own extermination in order to serve their interests [should also be punishable]' (p. 84). The Convention on Interculturality recommended that these considerations be explicitly added to the law, asking also that all attempts to contest the truth of the Jewish, Armenian and Rwandan genocides be punished (p. 85).

In a press communication in 2014, Unia called for moderation and dialogue, both on the internet and in the demonstration of support for the Palestinian people.

Preventive and repressive policy tools exist to tackle antisemitism, racism and discrimination at different institutional levels.

8.1.1 Interactions between state agencies and established civil society organizations

Interactions occur between state agencies, established civil society organizations and organizations representing migrants in various policy sectors. Given the Belgian tradition of socialization of the state and the practice of delegating public services to civil society organizations (Deschouwer, 2012), these interactions are organized in the framework of the social cohesion decree by regional integration centres in Wallonia and in Flanders, and by the Centre Bruxellois d'Action Interculturel (CBAI) in the Region of Brussels. The regional integration policies are based on the public funding of projects, civil society and migrant organizations. Moreover, organizations devoted to migrants such as Coordination for Refugees and Foreigners (CIRE) are contracted to implement the policy on the reception of asylum seekers.

Just as antisemitism is monitored by Unia and antisemitisme.be, Islamophia and Romaphobia are respectively reported in the categories of religious and ethnic discrimination. Not all minority groups have the resources and social capital to organize the monitoring of the racism and discrimination that their members experience. The CCIB try to report the complaints with the same categories used by antisemitisme.be, but in the annual report of Unia there are not any statistics to quantify Islamophobia.

8.2 Policies and programmes to counter antisemitism/racism

To the best of our knowledge, monitoring practices carried out by Unia have been recently published to coincide with the evaluation of the efficacy of antidiscriminatory and antiracist laws. However, owing to the federal and multilevel structure of the Belgian state, there is no general overview of the existing initiatives and programmes to counter antisemitism and racism.

8.2.1 Best practice

Unia's explanations of the nature of racism and its explorations of the damage it can cause are particularly interesting, in that it aims not just to punish, but to diminish racism and discrimination in Belgian society. Even as it demands sanctions against hate speech, Unia also suggests alternatives to judicial condemnation. These include recommendations for training that explains the criminal nature of racist behaviour and explores the hurt and damage that it can cause.

We also met one Jewish organization that refused to speak about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to maintain its focus on its goal of promoting diversity and an inclusive society in Europe.

9 Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

Recent immigration to Belgium has not led to a rise in antisemitic incidents. Interviews show that some new migrants arrive with the antisemitic prejudices of their country of origin, but those views are not at the centre of their worries or agenda in their daily life. At most, these prejudices sometimes result in the avoidance of Jews, but they do not lead to violence. Most of the new migrants are too busy with administrative procedures and duties involved in acquiring refugee or more permanent status, as well as rebuilding their lives after fleeing their home country. They are more concerned with finding a job and a home. A lot of them have experienced considerable obstacles in Belgium. The new migrants we interviewed have left their country because they were physically threatened or placed in danger by other people or by state policies. They express a desire to live a peaceful and secure life in Belgium and they are thankful to be in the country. Some speak of psychological traumas borne of experiences in their country of origin and during their travels to a new land. The antisemitic prejudices some of them express resulted more in practices of avoidances than in rhetorical or physical violence. Those who express antisemitic prejudice come not only from Muslim countries but from Orthodox and Christian contexts. No antisemitic incidents committed by new migrants have been reported during the interviews. Recent migrants may hold antisemitic views, but to date these have not been translated into action. There is a difference between representation and behaviour.

The perceived rise in antisemitism is not confirmed by the existing data or the data collected for this study. The existing data on antisemitic incidents does not show an increase in antisemitism over time; rather, it demonstrated that such incidents peaked during the escalation of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the terroristic episodes in Belgium. Therefore, the statistics and the interviews do not confirm a positive link between the arrival of new migrants and a rise of antisemitism. Moreover, there are no statistics for the instigators of hate crime. Consequently, any relationship between the instigation of antisemitic incidents and the wider population of immigrants and refugees could not be explored. Our interviews with representatives of Jewish associations did not provide evidence of any such relationship. In cases where the interviewees mentioned encountering some antisemitic views, those views had not led to antisemitic behaviour. Moreover, there is little contact between Jewish associations and new migrants. Examining the antisemitic incidents reported by antisemitisme.be shows that perpetrators of antisemitic acts and speeches come overwhelmingly from the host society.

Our qualitative enquiry highlights several interesting elements. It shows the heterogeneity of the Jewish population and organizations. In some parts of the Jewish population, there is a serious fear of new MENA migrants. This fear has been fed by the terrorist incidents that targeted Jewish organizations and individuals in Belgium and in France. The perception that recent MENA migrants are antisemitic is voiced by several representatives of Jewish organizations, who point to their socialization by antisemitic political regimes, their presumed hostility towards Israel and their similarity to the descendants of older MENA migrants. Fear of antisemitism, and the feeling that existing antisemitism

is not taken into account politically, provokes ethnic prejudices towards MENA migrants. What is surprising is that there are not any significant contacts between Jewish associations and new migrants.

Organizational staff dealing with new migrants, report that most are thankful to receive material and financial help during the asylum-seeking procedure and that they are relieved to be in Belgium. Despite the difficulties they perceived, including institutional racism, most of the recent migrants showed positive dispositions and demonstrated a willingness to integrate into Belgian society and accept Belgian values. Our interviewees also note that the new migrants are very keen to learn the language in order to quickly find a job.

Our interviews with new migrants reveal that many don't understand why they are associated with the second and further generation Moroccan and Turkish migrants. They try to distinguish themselves from these groups and to prove that they are better than them. The interviews also reveal the institutional racism they feel during the asylum procedure and the racist views that it can produce between different new migrant groups.

Surveys of political opinions reveal the widespread diffusion of antisemitic prejudices and views associated with conspiracy theories among the Belgian population. The antisemitism still at work in the Belgian political and media spheres is closely linked with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Monitoring practices show that antisemitic incidents in Belgium can sometimes be very violent and lead to death, but in general there is no increase in antisemitism. Among complaints about racist incidents, antisemitic incidents are, on average, filed more often than others.

The persistence of antisemitism and the rise in Islamophobia indicate that anti-racist and anti-discrimination policies could be improved by reducing social inequalities and further acknowledging these issues in political and policy terms. Comparing and establishing hierarchies between them should be avoided. Competing victimization only weakens efforts to combat racism.

Political competition aggravates competition between ethnic and minority groups by suggesting that there are differences in groups' willingness to integrate or in the gravity of the harm they experience. Creating a hierarchy among those who are most often subject to discrimination and its consequences does not help to define policy projects, but only slows down consideration of the structural causes and the tools needed to implement the projects.

Recommendations

Policy and practice

- All existing initiatives aimed at preventing racism and antisemitism at different levels should be mapped. Given the complexity of the institutional structure and the diversity of policy tools (Unia, laws, funded projects, popular education, cultural projects, etc. – see State and Civil Society Monitoring and Responses), it is difficult to have an overarching view of policy and projects in this domain. The mapping would be useful in order to determine whether the human, legal, and financial resources devoted to combatting racism and discrimination are sufficient to curb the persistence of racist language among members of the majoritarian group.
- Awareness training that explains what constitutes racist prejudice and discourse should be strengthened and deepened in order to diminish antisemitism in Belgian society.
- Awareness training targeting the different forms of racism and discrimination should be included in compulsory education programmes, vocational and long-life training and in the integration path.
- The teaching of immigration and colonization in Belgian history should be improved in schools in order to counter the sense of neglect on this issue among much of the Belgian immigrant population.
- Training should be given to police officers and administrators in charge of the registration of hate crimes, discrimination and racist complaints, in order to improve the monitoring process overall.
- Political representatives and media workers should be trained to recognize the trivialization and normalization of racism and antisemitism and the consequences of the absence of public condemnation of appeals to violence and hate.
- Public resources should be called on to fund security measures for Jewish buildings, thus ensuring equality of treatment and security rights.
- Contact between Jewish organizations and new migrants should be enhanced. The strategy of increasing contact builds empathy and produces positive results at the individual level.

Research

- The link between antisemitic language, prejudice against migrants and refugees and the rise of left and right populisms in Belgium should be thoroughly and systematically investigated.
- The extent to which the internet and primary and secondary socialization are channels of antisemitic discourses and attitudes should be investigated.
- The profile of the perpetrators of antisemitic incidents and those who hold antisemitic views should be systematically investigated in order to improve the understanding of the social conditions in which antisemitic incidents and views are produced.

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Appendices

List of Interviewees

Jewish associations, organizations, experts

- Comité de coordination des associations juives Kotek, Brussels, 12/09/2016
- Journalist, Brussels, 12/09/2016
- Centre communautaire Laïc Juif David Susskind, Brussels: 13/09/2016
- Member Joodse Forum of Vlanderen: Antwerp: 21/02/2017
- Member of the Joodse Forum of Vlanderen, Antwerp, 21/02/2017
- Consistoire central israélite de Bruxelles, Brussels, 27/02/2017
- trainer in the French-speaking secondary school for the program 'no to hate', Brussels: 23/09/2016
- Council of Jewish Women in Belgium, Antwerp, 16/10/2016
- Union des Juifs progressistes de Belgique, Brussels, 18/11/2016
- CEJI, 6/4/2017

Organizations working with new migrants

- Aide aux personnes déplacées, Braine-le-Comte: 27/09/2016
- Protestant social Center, Brussels: 18/11/2016
- Syrian translator, Brussels, 25/11/2016
- Trainer, the integration path for new migrants, Brussels, 16/11/2016
- Croix rouge, Brussels, 1/12/2016:
- Collective interview with workers of Exil, Brussels, 10/11/2016
- Josefa Foundation, Brussels, 1/12/2016

Organizations combatting racism and discrimination in Belgium

- Unia, Brussels, 28/09/2016
- MRAX, antiracist platform, 16/09/2016
- Enar, Brussels, 1/10/2016

New migrants

- Female migrant, 17 years old, from Guinea, Brussels, 7/12/2016
- Female migrant, 25 years old, from Eritrea, Brussels, 7/12/2016
- Eritrean translator, Brussels, 7/12/2016

‘Muslim’ organization

- Collectif contre l’islamophobie, Brussels, 1/12/2016

Belgian academics researching Muslim populations in Belgium

- Professor of political science at ULG, expert on ethnic issues, Brussels, 4/10/2016
- Islamologist, Liège, 30/09/2016
- Social scientist researcher working on daily and culinary practices of Moroccan women, Liège

Belgian academic researching antisemitism in Belgium

- Institut d’études du Judaïsme, ULB, Brussels, 13/09/2016

Topic guide for interviews

The intention is to explore experiences of racism and attitudes to racism in general.

- Have you/your clients experienced prejudice in this country?
- In your community/your client’s community are there prejudices that are directed against you or others – sectarian or national?
    - And what about prejudices your community may have toward the receiving society? [country]
    - Toward mainstream society?
    - Are there any specific groups your community is negative towards?
- How seriously do you think the receiving society:
    - Treats discrimination you experience?
    - How does this compare with other groups in society?
- How much compassion/attention/support do you think your cause/group will get in the receiving country?
- How important is your diasporic network as for e.g.: Muslim/Syrian
- Views of other diasporic/displaced groups
- How do you see attitudes to politics in your part of the world e.g.
    - Iraq and Afghanistan
    - Israel and Palestine
    - And will this continue?
- What do you think are the main differences between politics in this country and the one from which you came?
- Do you think this will influence how you think and act? Will you act or think differently? If yes/no – why?

Topics to raise with state and civil society groups/actors

- Do you have contacts with recent migrants?
- Do recent immigrants have anti-Jewish prejudices?
- Could you give your definition of antisemitism?
- An assessment of the degree to which recent immigrants and refugees accept the norms of toleration in the societies they have entered: do recent immigrants accept that even those with whom they disagree and towards whom they may feel aversion or contempt are entitled to equal rights and security?
- Is there a relationship between Islam and antisemitism?
- Has antisemitism been driven by the politicization of Islam and by Middle Eastern and North African immigrants and to what extent have other sources been significant?
- Is the experience or perception of Islamophobia ever used to justify antisemitic prejudices?
- In the context of recent immigration are there ways in which antisemitism and Islamophobia interact and feed off each other?
- What is the role of social media in generating antisemitism and other forms of racism?
- What is the role of the media and politicians in promoting open, balanced discussion on migrants, refugees and antisemitism? And on the relationship between them?

The intention is to explore experiences of racism and attitudes to racism in general.

- Have you/your clients experienced prejudice in this country?
- In your community/your client's community are there prejudices that are directed against you or others – sectarian or national?
- And what about prejudices your community may have toward the receiving society [country]:
    - Mainstream society?
    - Are there any specific groups your community is negative towards?
- How seriously do you think the receiving society:
    - Treats discrimination you experience?
    - How does this compare with other groups in society?
- How much compassion/attention/support do you think your cause/group will get in the receiving country
- How important is your diasporic network as for e.g.: Muslim/Syrian
- Views of other diasporic/displaced groups

- How do you see attitudes to politics in your part of the world e.g.
  - Iraq and Afghanistan
  - Israel and Palestine
  - And will this continue
- What do you think are the main differences between politics in this country and the one from which you came?
- Do you think this will influence how you think and act? Will you act or think differently? If yes/no – why?

Topics to raise with state and civil society groups/actors

- What kind of relationships do you have with recent migrants? In which context do you meet them?
- Do recent immigrants express racist prejudices?
- Do recent immigrants have anti-Jewish prejudices?
- An assessment of the degree to which recent immigrants and refugees accept the norms of toleration in the societies they have entered: do recent immigrants accept that even those with whom they disagree and towards whom they may feel aversion or contempt are entitled to equal rights and security?
- Is there a relationship between Islam and antisemitism?
- Has antisemitism been driven by the politicization of Islam and by Middle Eastern and North African immigrants and to what extent have other sources been significant?
- Is the experience or perception of Islamophobia ever used to justify antisemitic prejudices?
- In the context of recent immigration are there ways in which antisemitism and Islamophobia interact and feed off each other?
- What is the role of social media in generating antisemitism and other forms of racism?
- What is the role of the media and politicians in promoting open, balanced discussion on migrants, refugees and antisemitism? And on the relationship between them?

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